The first round of the presidential elections in Macedonia was marked by voter apathy reflected in the low turnout. In a way, the April 19th vote was the second time Macedonians rejected the Prespa Agreement. Macedonians first rejected the Prespa Agreement in 2018, when the referendum for constitutional changes failed due to insufficient turnout – de facto invalidating its results. And secondly, SDSM candidate Pendarovski, who ardently supports the Prespa Agreement, lost almost 100,000 votes compared to SDSM’s convincing victory in the 2017 local elections. The first round was such a disappointment for the governing coalition that Prime Minister Zaev promised a large-scale governmental reshuffle briefly after the elections.
With the runoff quickly approaching, both VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM predict that their candidate will win, and most analysts agree that Sunday’s election will be a close one. Although the presidency is largely a ceremonial post, its outcome could have important bearings for Macedonian politics in the next five years and beyond.
There are three possible scenarios from Sunday’s election: victory by either Pendarovski or Siljanovska-Davkova, or alternatively, a failure to reach the 40% voter turnout threshold necessary to validate the results. We examine these three eventualities and predict what we might expect in each case.
Scenario 1: Pendarovski Wins
Pendarovski, a consensus candidate supported by both SDSM and DUI, is a well-known figure in Macedonian political circles. A political scientist by training, Pendarovski is a former national security advisor and ex-presidential candidate. The narrative surrounding his candidacy has emphasized Pendarovski’s independent standing and his apparent non-partisanship. His campaign promotes dialogue between the political parties, and Pendarovski himself pledged to work on creating compromises that transcend ideological lines. In reality, he is closely intertwined with the governing coalition, and his positions align perfectly to those of SDSM and DUI. What might his potential victory mean for Macedonian politics?
For starters, it is likely that Pendarovski will tow SDSM’s party line. After all, as former national security advisor and current national coordinator for NATO accession, Pendarovski was the obvious choice for the social democrats. If elected, Pendarovski will likely conform to the policies of the governing coalition, and transform the presidency from a current bastion of opposition under Ivanov into an extension of the prime minister’s office. His victory will reverse the current no-signing-of-laws policy practiced by Ivanov, who has refused to approve laws that contain the name North Macedonia.
Like SDSM and DUI, Pendarovski has been a vocal supporter of the Prespa agreement. He argued that its provisions achieved two goals: first, they protected the Macedonian language, culture and civilizational beliefs, and second, they build the basis for long-lasting cooperation with Greece. He pledged to support the agreement’s full implementation and to work on maintaining positive relationship with Macedonia’s neighbors, including Greece.
Furthermore, the consensus candidate status that SDSM and DUI bestowed upon Pendarovski necessitates that his policies appease the Albanian voting bloc. One way Pendarovski has sought to live up to this status is by promising a cabinet that entirely reflects the multiethnic character of the country. If elected, Pendarovski will likely be under pressure from the Albanian camp to enhance Albanian’s role in the presidential cabinet.
On foreign policy Pendarovski also will tow the party line. He is a staunch supporter of Macedonia’s EU and NATO integration, and he views the United States as a key strategic partner of the country. Lastly, on the question of diaspora relations Pendarovski prioritizes two goals: creating incentives for investment by Macedonians living abroad, and encouraging young students who completed their education abroad to return to the country.
Scenario 2: Siljanovska-Davkova Wins
Although Siljanovska-Davkova shares a right-leaning political outlook with the party that nominated her, VMRO-DPMNE, in many key respects she represents a departure from the traditional party line. She appears more pragmatic compared to Ivanov, and her potential victory is likely to have some transformative effects on Macedonian society.
For example, Siljanovska-Davkova is the first female presidential candidate to make it to the runoff vote. Experience from other countries suggests that electing a female candidate to the presidency can increase the robustness and quality of a country’s democracy. Studies show that electing a female head of state has positive spillover effects in democratic societies, such as electing higher number of female legislators down the road. Siljanovska-Davkova has been upfront about this potentiality: she has repeatedly stressed the need to increase women’s role in society, and pledged to include a number of qualified women in her cabinet. As commander of the armed forces, Siljanovska-Davkova promised to create a Center of Excellence for Women, Peace and Security which will aim toward expanding women’s contribution in the military. All in all, electing a woman president will likely have some transformative effects on perceptions about leadership roles for women in Macedonian society.
Siljanovska-Davkova has also been a staunch opponent of the Prespa Agreement. She holds that enacting the agreement violated national law and is disputable within international law framework. Not only has Siljanovska-Davkova refused to use the adjective North to refer to Macedonia’s name, but she also vowed to contest the agreement before the International Court of Justice. Although she promised not to cancel the accord, she considers the issue to be legally open.
When it comes to domestic politics, Siljanovska-Davkova has put significant emphasis on the rule of law. This is unsurprising considering her background in legal studies. Her campaign stresses the rule of law as the precursor to a functioning meritocracy. Siljanovska-Davkova believes that the current constitution is the Achilles heel of Macedonian democracy, and has inconsistencies and flaws linked to fundamental rights and constitutional protections. She pledged to form a team of constitutional experts tasked with finding flaws with the existing constitution and proposing new amendments.
On foreign policy, Siljanovska-Davkova is a proponent of westward integration and wants to see Macedonia closer to the EU and NATO. Finally, she has maintained positive relationship with the Macedonian diaspora, and she vowed to create a National Council for Cooperation with the Diaspora.
Scenario 3: Failure to reach 40% turnout
The third scenario following Sunday’s election is a failure to reach 40% turnout, the constitutional requirement for considering the outcome legally binding. In this eventuality, a new presidential election could be called, or the speaker of Parliament, Talat Xhaferi, could temporarily assume the presidency.
The latter of the two alternatives is by far the most spine-chilling outcome because of the miscreant behavior that characterizes Xhaferi’s political life. For one, Xhaferi was army deserter who joined the terrorist structure that fought in the ethnic conflict in 2001 under the name commander Forino. Following the Ohrid Framework Agreement Xhaferi received amnesty and was able once more to return to his political ambitions.
On top of this, Xhaferi has shown utter disregard for the rule of law by circumventing existing legal limitations on his powers as speaker of Parliament. His very election was marred with irregularities and disrespect for standard parliamentary procedures. If Xhaferi assumes the presidency, his activities could seriously jeopardize the already fragile state of the Macedonian democracy.
Conclusion
No matter the outcome of the election, Macedonia will continue its westward journey in the next five years. The domestic implications, however, are likely to be more substantial depending on who wins the public’s support on Sunday. Whereas Pendarovski’s election is likely to be a continuation of the status quo in Macedonian politics, Siljanovska-Davkova has a potential to bring significant societal transformation to the fore.
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The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Macedonian Diaspora and Generation M.
A recent article by the BBC titled ‘Greece’s Invisible Minority’ caused much uproar among Greeks. Most notably, the Greek ambassador to the United Kingdom, Mr. Dimitris Caramitsos-Tziras, wrote a letter to the BBC protesting the publication of the article. His response was of little surprise to anyone familiar with Greece’s perennial attempts to whitewash the history of its Macedonian minority. As the Greek backlash against BBC’s account continues, we take a moment to break down Mr. Caramitsos-Tziras’ letter and address the inaccuracies and purposeful omissions contained in it.
Mr. Caramitsos-Tziras starts his letter by proclaiming that “there is only one minority in Greece, as recognized by international treaties, namely the Muslim minority”. By means of Greece’s systematic exclusion of minorities this statement is true. However, the reality is that Greece is home to numerous minorities, including a sizeable Macedonian minority. The Greek denial of minority rights was raised as an issue by the United Nations a decade ago, following an observation mission conducted in Greece. The report comes to the following conclusion:
“The independent expert urges the Government of Greece to withdraw from the dispute over whether there is a Macedonian or a Turkish minority in Greece and focus on protecting the rights to self-identification, freedom of expression and freedom of association of those communities. Their rights to minority protections must be honoured in accordance with the Declaration on Minorities and the core international human rights treaties. Greece should comply fully with the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights, specifically those decisions that associations should be allowed to use the words “Macedonian” and “Turkish” in their names and to express their ethnic identities freely.”
Mr. Caramitsos-Tziras continues the letter by reminding the BBC that Greece does not recognize the existence of the Macedonian language. The Ambassador quotes the Prespa Agreement, which defines the Macedonian language “exclusively as the official language of North Macedonia”. Mr. Caramitsos-Tziras is in fact right to point out that the Prespa Agreement attempts to construct a new definition for an existing language that has been used by Macedonians throughout history. The language provision of the Prespa Agreement is only the latest manifestation of a century old effort by Greek authorities to wipe out Macedonian language.
The next two paragraph of Mr. Caramitsos-Tziras’ letter deal with the issue of implicit recognition of Macedonian ethnicity. The Ambassador claims that “Greece retains the right to refer to the citizens that comprise the ethnic majority in our neighboring country with the terms used to-date, whereas they retain the right to self-identification”. The Ambassador failed to note the rich history of Greek campaigns, both international and domestic, that sought to eradicate the existence of a Macedonian minority and prevent “Slavic speakers” from self-identifying as Macedonians. For example, in recent bilateral history Greece has used the derogatory term “Skopianos” to refer to Macedonians. Successive Greek governments have also embarked on diplomatic missions intended to rollback international recognition of Macedonia and Macedonians. Domestically, Greece has a long history of denying the existence of a Macedonian minority. Most noteworthy is Greek dictator Metaxas’ 1936 order of prohibition 122770, which made it illegal for Macedonians to speak Macedonian and forcibly changed Macedonian names into Greek ones.
Finally, Mr. Caramitsos-Tziras points out that the Prespa Agreement contains no reference to Macedonia retaining its right to support Macedonians in neighboring countries. This is one of the many reasons why the Prespa Agreement serves as yet another attempt by Greece to whitewash of its history. Refusal to acknowledge the existence of a Macedonian minority in Greece is central to the Greek effort to circumvent its past and present treatment of Macedonians.
In sum, Mr. Caramitsos-Tziras’ response to the BBC article is filled with inaccuracies and purposeful omissions. The Ambassador’s praise of specific Prespa Agreement provisions which nullify the right of Macedonians to repatriate their rights and losses is unbecoming for a member state of the European Union. We hope that future Greek efforts to distort history and disseminate lies about its treatment of Macedonians will be met with an appropriate international condemnation.
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The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Macedonian Diaspora and Generation M.
As stated by the first Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov at the French Institute of International Affairs in 1993:
“The right to a people to use its own name is natural and inalienable.” President Kiro Gligorov Circa. 1993
Indeed such remarks were supported by UN mediator Matthew Nimetz in Greece 1995 stating that “Greece cannot choose the name. Greece can only say that it is against the name chosen… Not even the UN is the one to choose the name… they can decide to address us with “former British colony North America.” That is not our name just as FYROM is not the name of this country.” Yet, ironically enough, twenty-three years later, Nimetz himself was directly involved and played a crucial role in the negotiations concerning Macedonia’s name change to the ‘Republic of North Macedonia,’ firmly highlighting Western double standards and hypocrisy, which take place when certain political interests need to be fulfilled.
Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and the Greek Parliament after they approve the name change (Source: Guardian)
One might say that therefore the new year has indeed brought new changes, yet as some would say unwanted changes, especially in regards to the ratification of the Prespa Agreement, giving birth to ‘North Macedonia’ and beginning the process of European integration. This was happily welcomed by Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev, who stated at a press conference on the 30th of January that “Great Britain has freed a place, so that we can take a place in the European Union.” Unfortunately for the PM, that’s not exactly how European integration works. Rather realist connotations of international relations would highlight a nonpartisan concern for whether Macedonia is named as FRYOM, North Macedonia or Funkytown as dubbed by a satirical article, considering that integration here has arguably been used as a means of securing influence and power in the region. Indeed, this becomes further apparent when considering Putin’s comments, stating that the US wants to assert dominance in the Balkans with Macedonia’s name change, as NATO accession talks increases western influence and is perceived to be a destabilising factor in the Balkans, especially when NATO expansionism tends to be seen as a relic of the cold war.
Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev now seeks to join NATO and the EU with this name change (Source: ABC)
The 25th of January, seen as a ‘historic day for Greece and Macedonia,’ saw the controversial parliamentary approval and ratification of the Prespa Agreement by both participating nations. However, numerous accusations of corruption, manipulation and bribery came to light (unfortunately, this was at no surprise), especially when considering that the referendum held in the Republic of Macedonia in September 2018, asking Macedonian’s to change its constitutional name, resulted in a low turnout, which did not meet the threshold required to make legislative and constitutional changes. In other words, the actions of PM Zaev and parliamentarians completely and wholly ignored the majority of the Macedonian population, going against the peoples will, and re-naming a nation – creating a rather, new, politically correct one. Hence by doing so, disdaining an identity and memory that has been built on certain historical narratives just as any other nation has, further denying its sovereignty and the right to self-determination. By proceeding to pass such proposals, representatives have ironically violated those exact democratic principles which they have preached at the ballot box, election time, and press conferences, emphasising the essence of European integration and the need for Macedonia’s constitutional name change as a means of entering into a peaceful, co-operative and economically beneficial Union. Sadly, however, all that has been currently proven is that a continuous cycle of false promises, legislative and democratic failure, corruption, interference and manipulation remains. We merely need to look to the International Court of Justice who in 2008 found Greece in violation of a bilateral agreement signed between the two nations in 1995, preventing Macedonia’s accession to international organisations by continuously vetoing its membership. Not to mention, as highlighted by Professor Dr. Gordana Siljanovska Davkova, that the Prespa Agreement violates the UN Charter itself, as the Republic of Macedonia has been forced to negotiate its name, constitution, legal system and identity.
Protesters against the name change (Source: ABC)
Politics has in a sense pervaded everyday life in Macedonia, as almost everything becomes politicised or is a direct consequence of politics. Family get-togethers involve political talk, people are at times divided based on the political party which they are affiliated with, medical appointments become impossible unless patients slip extra denari under the table or a bag of coffee to receive treatment, money saved by town members to asphalt the road has been stolen by council members and the road has only been completed half way. This, and indeed so much more became evident to me during my stay over the university break. Everybody talks politics, believing that some change will be brought with the name change, yet now even those who believed in the PM and voted in favour of ‘North Macedonia’ show regret as they realise they haven’t read the terms and conditions of the Prespa Agreement at all. Most deny the presence of democracy and the rule of law completely, often admitting that no matter what they do, vote yes or no, vote for one politician over another, that the outcome is known in advance, that those who hold power, internally and externally, have already decided the outcome. Unfortunately, so many feel hopeless, working for merely €200 euros a month – this is where political tensions and public outrage emerge.
It is important however to note that no one has thus far been against ‘friendship, peace and co-operation’ between the two nations, indeed, an old Macedonian saying claims that ‘za lošo za arno komšijata e prv’ (‘for better or for worse your neighbours are here/first to help.’) Instead, what is most concerning is when one realises that this agreement has come with a cost that seems to be overlooked by many, as widespread denial continues to exist, with comments such as Greek Deputy Citizens’ Protection Minister Katerina Papacosta:
“My reading [of the deal] is positive in specific points… the name Macedonia “had been usurped” for years and now “it returns to us, along with its culture.”
Those in Macedonia and within the diaspora dubbed as ‘nationalists’ or ‘conservatives’ have rather been misunderstood, as considerably, all that they are advancing for is recognition and respect of international law and human rights. Acknowledging, recognising and respecting the constitution of a nation and its people, just as we respect that of Australia, the US and Russia, for we have a right of non-interference in a nations internal affairs, especially when considering something so distinct and intrinsic, such as a nations name and the identity/nationality of its people.
Indeed, this requires the international community to take a step back and ask itself, would this be allowed in Russia, America, or China, or indeed any other influential power in the world?… I can already hear the reader whispering no. Then why is this international matter being congratulated and labelled as a ‘brave’ ‘historical moment’ when “Macedonians/Citizens of the Republic of North Macedonia” (for this is what they will be referred to as now) are purely asking to be accepted as who and what they’ve always been – simply, Macedonian.
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The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Macedonian Diaspora and Generation M.
The Prespa Agreement is a monstrosity. It’s moral and political spew on every ground. Every one of its pages imbues the Orwellian warning, “The most effective way to destroy people is to deny and obliterate their own understanding of their history”. Not only does it suffocate the cries of ethnic cleansing from the not-so-distant past, but it also attempts to draw a moral equivalence between the parties as being co-equal aggressors and transgressors in this dispute.
Effectively, Macedonia will become the first politically correct state in Europe. Pride in one’s people, culture, and heritage, nowadays seen as embarrassing and vestigial relics of a bygone era, will be steamrolled by an unstoppable train of progress and social engineering. These new “Macedonians/Citizens of the Republic of North Macedonia” (Somehow, I don’t think that will translate well into our folk songs) will wake up to a Macedonian state in name only. Macedonia will no longer be seen as the nation-state of the Macedonian people and a home for all of its minorities. It will be a modern, censored political construct—wholly disconnected from its roots and past for the sake of a rootless transnational agenda agreed upon in the upper echelons of power in Brussels.
That being said, this is not the worst we have been dealt. The Serbian authorities under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia attempted to erase Macedonia from the map, and relentlessly uproot all remnants of its non-Serbian past. Bulgarian fascist terror in World War II made even the German Nazis fare better in the eyes of Macedonians by comparison. And lest we forget the terror of the Metaxas regime in Greece, where speaking Macedonian or even mentioning Macedonia could result in physical torture, if not outright death.
The Prespa Agreement is nowhere near the level of brutality we have seen in the past. However, it can be—if we let it. If we sit back, continue complaining vocally but doing nothing, and thus allowing our children, grandchildren, and posterity to be eradicated. This won’t happen overnight; it’s an ever-so-slow drip of complacency and indifference that accumulates over time to a nightmarish reality.
However, according to recent reports, 68% of Greece is against the agreement. To us, this may seem odd. Why would hyper-nationalistic and paranoid Greece be so opposed to an agreement that secures their claims to the legacy of ancient Macedonia, as well as control over our use of symbols and history textbooks? Well, despite all the footnotes in the Prespa Agreement about our language, and the convoluted formulaic ways of expressing our nationality, Greece still technically loses out. Outside the narrow bubble of international law—NO ONE, and I repeat NO ONE— will mentally disassociate our people, who speak the Macedonian language and are called Macedonians, from the past heritage of Macedonia. Think about it. Do you think the average Western traveler when hearing that the Macedonians live in “North Macedonia”, will think to immediately refer to Article 8 of the Prespa Agreement to see that the terms “Macedonian” in this context refer to a different people, history and culture, than those of the ancient period? Of course not, but this won’t dishearten Greek Twitter from trying.
By agreeing even to a quasi-recognition (notice, I don’t mean a full recognition) of a Macedonian language and nationality, Greece has opened its appropriately-named Pandora’s box. Despite all the attempts over the years by Greek keyboard warriors to correct BBC or CNN headlines with “FYROM” instead of Macedonia, Greece had already lost the battle to remove Macedonia from outside usage in the late 90s. Now it will take on the Herculean task of explaining how their recognition of a Macedonian language and nationality does not amount to a recognition of an ethnic Macedonian people. Not to mention it will also have to explain how some of the people in their own borders who speak that same Macedonian language they recognized are not in fact of the same stock of people as their neighbors to the north. In a word, it can’t. As stated in a Greek article, “However, these distinctions do not change the fact that, no matter what the Greek government is saying, people with the Macedonian nationality, who speak the Macedonian language, will automatically be considered ethnic Macedonians.”
This is where the diaspora, the church, family and community have to truly show their worth. None of the intended and malicious outcomes of the agreement can come true if we do not let them.
Our history books will eventually be revised and mandated to call all place-names in Aegean Macedonia by their Greek names. Kukush (the birthplace of Goce Delcev) will thus become Kilkis to our students. However, even after the Greeks physically razed it to the ground and renamed it Kilkis, it never slipped away from the collective memory of the Macedonian people–our greatest junak was born there. Why should it now?
The state will be forbidden from using the 16-rayed Macedonian sun in a public capacity. Even when our flag was forcibly changed, the Macedonian people have not given up using this rightful ethnic symbol. Not one iota. In fact, it has fantastically increased in its usage, and I encourage ever-more use.
And most importantly, no faceless bureaucrat in Brussels can ever compel anyone to call themselves anything but Macedonians. No one can forbid us from privately teaching our children our true history: the glorious conquests of Alexander; the holy work of St. Cyril and Methodius; the terror of the partition of our lands.
As in Ottoman times, in the face of adversity, we have to return to our roots. The church, not the state, has to become the glue to our community and culture. We have to strengthen our family units—invest heavily in ensuring our traditions, culture, language, and history are transmitted to future generations. Furthermore, diaspora groups must join forces to act as a vanguard for the interests of Macedonians. This means not allowing any utterance of “North Macedonians” or “Slav Macedonians” by uninformed commentators. This means aggressive and targeted marketing to sell the beauty of our land, culture and true history to everyone interested. Even when our government will ask us “in good will” to reconsider using the name “Macedonia” for our private businesses we, of course, have to act and politely show them the door. In a word, we have to be subversive in the name of injustice.
Is the Prespa Agreement a garbage fire of an agreement? Yes. Will it solve any of our problems? Probably not. Can the agreement do anything to curtail a united and subversive Macedonian people? Well, you tell me. Are you ready to move away from patriotic Facebook posts and put your money where your mouth is? Preserving our identity for our posterity, especially in the diaspora, will not be an easy task. Subverting the intended goals of the Prespa Agreement will be even harder. But out of this chaos, we have secured an infinitely strategic starting point–a Macedonian language, nationality, and state recognized by Greece. No matter the legalistic jargon about the actual scope of the Greek recognition, this trifecta offers the opportunity for us to control the optics and narrative surrounding our identity. Only an apathetic and disunited people can let mere words on a paper trample on them and extinguish all hope.
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The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Macedonian Diaspora and Generation M.
II – Social Capital and the Coevolution of Formal & Informal Institutions
III – Is Social Capital Actually “Capital”?
IIII – Social Capital as Social Entitlement (Integrated with Identity)
V – A Social Entitlement and Institutional Analysis of Macedonia’s Dilemma
VI – Conclusion
VII – References
I. Introduction
Macedonia has been trapped in a perpetual identity crisis since its’ independence in 1991, with issues internally, regarding ethnic nationalism, and externally, regarding international recognition. Outcomes from this have been ‘political crisis’ and ‘weak economic policies’ which have significantly hampered Macedonia’s economic development (US AID, 2018). In 2017, Macedonia’s GDP growth rate was at 0.02%, due to low domestic consumption stemming from stagnating incomes, with more than a fifth of the country’s population remaining unemployed (US AID, 2018; World Bank, 2018a; World Bank, 2018b). Furthermore, apart from the republic’s Industrial and Technological Development Zones attracting foreign investment, overall investment levels outside of these zones are low and private sector lending is not sufficiently meeting the country’s demand (US AID, 2018). To help understand Macedonia’s predicament, this paper aims to elucidate the dynamic between identity and economic development by analysing the dilemma through an institutional lens.
II. Social Capital and the Coevolution of Formal & Informal Institutions
Douglass C. North (1990) defines institutions as ‘the rules of the game’ in a society. Such ‘rules’, North (1991) states, consist of ‘informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct)’ which are established by informal institutions, and ‘formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)’ which are established by formal institutions. Institutions exist to aid cooperation between private and public actors by defining such rules, which ‘facilitate exchange’ by producing ‘predictable human behaviour in a world of uncertainty and incomplete knowledge’ (North, 1990). Thus, the structure and stability that institutions can offer helps agents to make collective choices that would otherwise be chaotic and inefficient. Although North did well distinguishing the two forms of institutions and rules that exist, how these institutions interact with each other and how informal institutions can be defined more precisely, than the vague notion of “culture”, remain unclear (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015).
Putnam et al. (1993) make a valuable effort to expand on what informal institutions are, which they define as the ‘bundle of virtues’ which pertain to a ‘civic community’ that sum to make ‘social capital’. They state that the four virtues of a ‘civic community’ are: ‘civic participation’; ‘political equality’; ‘solidarity, trust, and tolerance’; and ‘associational life’ (Putnam et al., 1993). Putnam et al. (1993) apply this theory to the unequal economic conditions between north and south Italy, clarifying that more ‘social capital’ was accrued in northern Italy which led to better self-organisation; rules of exchange; and mutual trust in comparison to southern Italy. Thus, even after the unification of north and south Italy in the 19thcentury, and with same formal institutions being established over both regions, the north ended up better off economically as they accumulated more social capital than their counterpart from centuries before.
Woolcock and Narayan (2000) build on the social capital definition of informal institutions to develop a ‘synergy’ view of institutions, which highlights the relationship between formal institutions and social capital. Their theory states that rules, regulations, and structures founded by the state constantly interact with social organisations, which creates a feedback loop between formal and informal institutions. Woolcock and Narayan (2000) clarify that formal institutions without social commitment and involvement are ‘empty institutions’, where rules are established formally but are not respected socially. Fukuyama (1995) concurs, adding that a successful society cannot solely function on interpersonal trust (social capital), it also requires establishing formal institutions that can better enforce values and further support cooperation beyond what informal institutions can do alone.
Such theory highlights the coevolution of formal and informal institutions, and the inappropriate approach to separate the two forms when analysing institutions because of such feedback loop. Using this line of reasoning Chang (2011) points out the risks of ‘institutional imitation’, stating that simply ‘importing’ formal institutions may not produce the same outcomes seen in the exporting country, as the ‘importing country may be missing the necessary supporting informal institutions’. Both formal and informal institutions cannot be developed successfully without considering their counterpart; hence, a coevolution and co-development approach is needed for a successful institutional ecosystem to flourish.
Though there have been great strides in understanding the dynamics of institutions, it is still unclear how formal and informal institutions interact and affect each other, which in part can stem back from how informal institutions are defined as social capital (Bertin & Sirven, 2006, cited in Clary et al. 2006). Notwithstanding the definition of social capital has helped clarify what informal institutions are and has been useful in building an understanding of how institutions coevolve, the term itself is still quite imprecise ‘with multiple and often conflicting definitions’ (Robison et al., 2002). Thus, redefining social capital more accurately could help bring a better understanding to the dynamics of institutions.
III. Is Social Capital Actually “Capital”?
Arrow (1999, cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 1999) has been a fervent critic of the metaphor “capital” being used in defining what informal institutions are, as he states the term does not effectively capture the nuances of social networks and interactions. Capital is a specific asset that is clearly fungible and is accumulated through coherent market functions with the sole motive of being utilised to accrue more assets (Bertin & Sirven, 2006, cited in Clary et al. 2006). Concerning an agent’s motive for interacting with informal institutions, the reward is often more ‘intrinsic – that is, the interaction is the reward – or at least the motives for interaction are not economic’ (Arrow, 1999, cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 1999). Arrow (1999, cited in Dasgupta & Serageldin, 1999) further clarifies this with the analogy that although individuals can ‘get jobs through networks of friendship or acquaintance’, they do not often solely join social networks for this reason. Thus, informal institutions have more complex purposes than capital’s explicitly singular purpose of accumulating more assets. Additionally, informal institutions are not clearly fungible and are not exchanged effectively through market functions, as capital is (Bertin & Sirven, 2006, cited in Clary et al. 2006).
Clark and Mills (1979), who distinguish the existence of two key relationships in social networks, being exchange and communal relationships, help explain how informal institutions behave. For agents that may not be closely related to an informal institution, such as strangers and acquaintances, an exchange relationship is often established which can mimic the functions of capital (Clark & Mills, 1979). Although the exchange in this relationship is still not clearly fungible and is not exchanged through market structures as capital is, it does mimic capital exchange in the sense that ‘benefits are given with the expectation of receiving a benefit in return’; thus, ‘the receipt of a benefit incurs a debt or obligation to return a comparable benefit’ (Clark & Mills, 1979). Observations of this kind of social exchange can explain the misinterpretations of ‘social capital’ being sufficient in defining social network behaviour. However, this type of relationship is often reserved for agents who do not have a strong tie to a certain informal institution; hence, they do not reap the full capacity of benefit from said social network. Furthermore, this perspective would only explain the behaviours of informal institutions towards a subset of agents who are not very participatory.
For agents that are closely related and very participatory in certain informal institutions, such as family and friends, a communal relationship is more likely to be established (Clark & Mills, 1979). Within a communal relationship, how exchange is carried out completely deviates from how capital is exchanged, in the sense that benefits are not given contingently (Clark & Mills, 1979). In this type of relationship benefits are given in support of one’s welfare, and if an agent believes a benefit is solely given in response to past benefits received the relationship is compromised, as the assumption of mutual consideration towards their welfare is called into question (Clark & Mills, 1979). Agents that have this type of relationship within social networks are most likely to reap the full capacity of benefits, as what is of utmost focus is the agent’s welfare.
The core of most significant informal institutions derives from communal relationships, whereas at the fringe of such institutions exchange relationships are established for agents estranged or not substantially participatory. Thus, a big part of social network behaviour can be understood by communal relationships, not solely by the capital-esque exchange relationships that only explains the lesser part of informal institutions. With such nuance to social networks, if informal institutions are to be redefined more accurately the “capital” metaphor is insufficient, as it is evident that the metaphor can be misleading and myopic.
IIII. Social Capital as Social Entitlement (Integrated with Identity)
Bertin and Sirven (2006, cited in Clary et al. 2006) highlight anthropological literature which indicate that social networks follow normative obligations that depart from how capital goods are exchanged. Agents within informal institutions have access to benefits and resources based on “entitlements” (Bertin & Sirven, 2006, cited in Clary et al. 2006). Additionally, anyone who desires support requires being ready to provide support to network members in return (Bertin & Sirven, 2006, cited in Clary et al. 2006). Regarding communal relationships, this readiness to give support to “entitled” members is non-specific, whereas exchange relationships can be contingent on receipts of social exchange. Nevertheless, this rights-based approach to access resources in informal institutions differs greatly to how capital goods are accessed, where such entitlement-based exchange does not exist in the market mechanism. Hence, a rights-based definition would be most suitable to adequately define informal institutions and their behaviour.
Amartya Sen’s (1981) entitlement approach can be used as a framework to help define informal institutions, which Sen used to help understand poverty and famine. The key proponent of Sen’s (1981) theory is “means to access”, as he clarifies that even when countries have enough food famines still occur, which arise when agents do not have the entitlements (such as legal rights) to command food. Sen (1981) defines such scenario as ‘entitlement failure’, which ensues when agents do not have access to certain resources due to the limitations of their networking capability. Hence, regarding poverty and famine, it is not solely to do with the resources available but also networking ‘capabilities’ agents have (Sen, 1985). Therefore, Sen (1999) proposes that rights should be established for ‘capabilities’ that are fundamental for human existence, such as ‘political’, ‘economic’, ‘social’ and ‘security’.
Sen’s theory nicely breaks down the functioning of social networks into the agent’s entitlements/capabilities and resources transformed from endowed or developed entitlements/capabilities. Hence, a “social entitlement” definition, deriving from Sen’s entitlement approach, would sufficiently define informal institutions and consequently brings clarity to the dynamics of formal and informal institutions. However, a limitation of using the Sen’s capability approach to define informal institutions is that ‘the framework lacks a short-list of essential capabilities’, which he refused to do ‘on the grounds of flexibility in application and social diversity’ (Davis, 2004). As a result, this limits the inferences that can be made and the effectiveness of such definition.
John B. Davis (2004) attempts to improve upon the limitations of Sen’s theory by anchoring the capability approach to ‘identity’. Davis (2011) follows the logic of Sen who implies that agents are a collection of multiple entitlements, and further builds that agents are also a collection of multiple identities (such as ethnicity, gender, class, family role etc.). The bundle of self-concepts that individuals have contain identities that are inherited (imposed) and identities that are developed by choice. An agent’s self-concepts ‘are continually being revised’ and are regularly competing for priority due to ‘conflicting demands’ (Davis, 2011). Davis (2011) states that how agents self-identify guides how their entitlements are developed, as an agent’s identity will determine the individual’s capabilities to access and build informal institutions that is required to gain resources needed. Therefore, if there are restrictions to how an agent self identifies this can lead to entitlement failure. Consequently, with identity determining agents’ interactions with informal institutions and the development of capabilities, Davis (2011) posits that identity should be protected as a human right following Sen’s logic of protecting fundamental capabilities.
With Davis’s addition of anchoring the social entitlement definition of informal institutions to identity, it gives it a base to which inferences can effectively be made and ‘preserves’ Sen’s intuition that ‘the capability framework works best when it flexibly accommodates social diversity’ (Davis, 2004). Hence, with said improvements, social entitlement more successfully defines and explains informal institutions than “social capital”. Figure 1 summarises the social entitlement definition of informal institutions.
V. A Social Entitlement and Institutional Analysis of Macedonia’s Dilemma
Recently, Macedonia’s identity and economic dilemma has come to the fore due to a referendum vote that was held September 2018. The referendum was concerning whether Macedonia should change its’ name to “North Macedonia” to resolve the 27-year name dispute with Greece. The outcome of the referendum was a resounding rejection by the Macedonian citizens, in the form of national boycotts, with ‘just over a third of Macedonians’ voting in the referendum when a ‘50%’ vote benchmark was needed (BBC, 2018). Nevertheless, against the will of the people, Macedonia’s Prime Minister Zoran Zaev secures a parliament vote to change the country’s name to ‘North Macedonia’ (BBC, 2019). Hence, Macedonian’s were essentially stuck with a choice of two unsatisfactory options, both of which would restrict the republic’s ability to self-identify. In essence, Macedonia would either be forced into an identity they do not recognise, to avoid Greece isolating Macedonia from the international community via ‘lobbying’, or maintain their current UN reference name (“F.Y.R.O.M.”) that they also do not recognise, but with hopes of leaving the door open to self-identify in the future (Sofos, 2013, cited in MIC, 2013). When citizens chose the latter option, expressing their desire to self-identify, the current Macedonian government rejected this and went against the people’s wishes.
Although the intentions of the Macedonian government are understandable, as they try to avoid global isolation incurred by Greek lobbying, they are overlooking the importance of self-identification in forming a successful institutional ecosystem. As the country has not been able to freely develop a national identity, it has not developed substantial national social networks; hence, people have turned to ethnic identifications that yield stronger informal institutions. Consequently, this has led to ethnic identities becoming ‘polarised’ and even divisively ‘mobilised’ to benefit in-groups, particularly between the ethnic Macedonian majority and ethnic Albanian minority (Adamson & Jović, 2004). Macedonia’s formal institutions further reinforce this, as within the political framework ethnicity is heavily ‘politicised’ to the extent that a majority of political parties are based on ethnic identification (Adamson & Jović, 2004). This has led to political instability and violence for the country, with World Bank (2018c) giving Macedonia a low rank of 37.14% for ‘political stability and absence of violence’ in 2017. Such conflict and political instability has been a major setback for Macedonia progressing economic development, as it is ‘regarded by economists as a serious malaise harmful to economic performance’ (Aisen & Veiga, 2011).
Although, Aisen and Veiga (2011), through quantitative testing, have found that ethnic heterogeneity is harmful to economic development. They present that lower ethnic homogeneity connote less social cohesion, which results in weak institutions and economic policies (Aisen & Veiga, 2011). Thus, it could be argued that the crux of Macedonia’s dilemma solely boils down to the republic being too ethnically diverse and that self-identification is irrelevant.
However, there are outlier cases that can elucidate more nuance regarding what Aisen and Veiga found and implied from their statistical assessments. One example is the similarly ‘landlocked’ Switzerland which is very successful with its’ economic development, as the nation is one of the ‘richest’ and most developed countries in the world, although it has a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity (Wachter et al, 2018; Weder and Weder, 2009). A key difference between Macedonia and Switzerland is that Switzerland has a national identity that citizens identify with. Consequently, Swiss citizens can interact and form successful national social networks in which they can effectively develop their capabilities and support one another, rather than falling back on ethnic identification which tends to be conflicting, divisive, and negative for a nation’s prosperity. Hence, from this comparison, it seems more likely that the crux of Macedonia’s dilemma is the nation’s restricted ability to self-identify. However, to be able to consolidate such hypothesis further case study testing would be necessary.
Nevertheless, such analysis does highlight the importance of self-identification for Macedonia. As from a social entitlement and institutional examination, Macedonia’s deprivation of self-identification has led to ethnically divided social networks, and as institutions coevolve this has influenced the state to be ethnically divided. Thus, this has ultimately led to Macedonia having an unhealthy institutional ecosystem breeding political instability and conflict that has severely affected the nation’s economic development. Therefore, it would be advisable for the current Macedonian regime to take more consideration towards supporting the republic’s will to self-identify, rather than sentencing the country to an identity that the citizen’s do not relate to, otherwise the same internal turmoil will likely continue hampering the nation’s economic development and wellbeing. In sum, a multi-ethnic democratic Macedonia can be successful if the citizens additionally have a mutual identity they relate to, as the example of Switzerland would suggest.
VI. Conclusion
To conclude, this paper aids in understanding Macedonia’s dilemma by elucidating the dynamic between identity and economic development through institutional analysis. This is done by reviewing the current literature on institutional economics and revising some of the theory. The definition of “social capital” was revised to “social entitlement” through the work of various social scientists, with two key contributions coming from Amartya Sen and John B. Davis. Additionally, a model was created, in which both definition and model integrate identity in their explanations of informal institutions. This was done to improve the understanding of institutions and their dynamics. Social entitlement and institutional analysis hints that Macedonia’s restricted ability to self-identify has negatively affected their ability to develop a healthy institutional ecosystem, which consequently has negatively affected their economic development.
VII. References
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Alesina, A. and Giuliano, P. (2015) ‘Culture and Institutions’. Journal of Economic Literature. 53(4) pp. 898-944.
Arrow, K.J. (1999) ‘Observations on Social Capital’. In Dasgupta, P. and Serageldin, I. (1999) Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. Washington: The World Bank.
BBC (2018) Macedonia Referendum: Name Change Vote Fails to Reach Threshold.BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-45699749[Accessed: 20 December, 2018].
BBC (2019) Macedonia Parliament Agrees to Change Country’s Name.BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-46846231[Accessed: 15 January, 2019].
Bertin, A.L. and Nicolas, S. (2006) ‘Social Capital and the Capability Approach’. In Clary, J.B., Dolfsma, W. and Figart, D.M. (eds.) (2006) Ethics and the Market: Insights from Social Economics. Marquette: Routledge.
Chang, H. (2011) ‘Institutions and economic development: theory, policy and history’. Journal of Institutional Economics. 7(4) pp. 473-498.
Clark, M.S. and Mills, J. (1979) ‘Interpersonal Attraction in Exchange and Communal Relationships’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 37(1) pp. 12-24.
Davis B.J. (2004) ‘Identity and Commitment: Sen’s Conception of the Individual’. Tinbergen Institute. 2(55) pp. 1-31.
Davis B.J. (2011) Individuals and Identity in Economics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Fukuyama, F. (1995) Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press.
North, D.C. (1990)Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, D.C. (1991) ‘Institutions’. The Journal of Economic Perspectives.5(1) pp. 97-112.
Putnam, R.C., Leonardi, R. and Nonetti, R.Y. (1993) Making Democracy Work:Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sen, A. (1981) Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. (1985) Commodities and Capabilities. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sofos, S.A. (2013) ‘Beyond the Intractability of the Greek-Macedonian Dispute’. In MIC (eds.) (2013) The Name Issue Revisited: An Anthology of Academic Articles. Skopje: MIC.
Weder, B. & Weder, R. (2009) Switzerland’s Rise to a Wealthy Nation: Competition and Contestability as Key Success Factors. Research Paper 2009/025. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
Woolcock, M. and Narayan, D. (2000) ‘Social capital: implications for development theory, research, and policy’. The World Bank Research Observer. 15(2) pp. 25-249.
World Bank (2018a)GDP growth (annual %). World Bank. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=MK[Accessed: 20 December, 2018].
World Bank (2018b)Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate). World Bank. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=MK[Accessed: 20 December, 2018].
World Bank (2018c)Worldwide Governance Indicators. World Bank. Available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home[Accessed: 20 December, 2018].
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The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Macedonian Diaspora and Generation M.
I exist I’m sorry that this offends you That this threatens you I mean you no harm
My grandfather is old Soon he will cease to exist in this world Happy?
My grandfather doesn’t like change Same chair, same clothes, same meal, same routine, Like his cigarette with his coffee sameness is his comfort But change haunts him
He has two surnames One ends in ‘ski’ the other in ‘kis’ He doesn’t know how old he is When his birthday is
A birth certificate does not exist The village, in which his new-born cries once pierced the air signalling his arrival into the world, no longer exists As a name on a map. Though somewhere there is soil that still remembers his childhood footsteps Somewhere trees have grown nourished by his young spilt blood
Soon he will die, not on this land, but far away And then who will he be? What do you propose should be written on his tombstone? Why do i have to ask you this?
He doesn’t know his name or age He only knows who his family is Who his parents were His tongue still remembers how to effortlessly speak a language for which it was once burnt He remembers the smell and taste of castor oil He knows who was responsible He knows who didn’t come to help He knows all this He knows because he is Macedonian He is Macedonian He is Macedonian He is Macedonia
Who do you think he is? Who do you think you are to have a say in this? A Macedonian you reply? Well okay Have that written on your tombstone if you wish
He wants nothing from you You can have his childhood home You can have his mother’s grave You already claimed it with your writing You can have his name
He asks only for the one thing he knows
His identity
He is Macedonian
Are you humane enough to allow him this?
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The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Macedonian Diaspora and Generation M.
Abraham Lincoln once said, “the government of the people, by the people and for the people shall not perish from the earth.” This most sincere description of what democracy looks like reigns supreme not just here in the United States, but in any nation state around the world where the ship steers according to the will of the people.
The will of the people is why we Macedonians here in the United States, and abroad, are ignited to fight like never before for our fellow Macedonians in the Republic of Macedonia. Like UMD says, United, We Can. In 2019, let’s also say United, We Will!
I am a member of UMD and live in the Cleveland, Ohio area. I visited Washington D.C. on January 3, 2019 to visit and meet with members of the US Congress and staff. Leadership, staff and members of the United Macedonian Diaspora accompanied me. This particular date was the day of the swearing in ceremonies for the newly elected and re-elected members of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate.
During my visit, I also stopped by the UMD Office. I was amazed at how close the UMD Headquarters is to the White House. This reminded me of how vital it is for Macedonians to have a seat at the table in our nation’s capital and I applaud UMD for how many connections they have worked to create in Washington D.C. over the years.
When we got to Capitol Hill that day, the halls were full of excitement. There were people from all different walks of life who came to meet these public officials and their staff. Being on Capitol Hill is always humbling. It serves as a reminder to be proud to be a U.S. Citizen and proud of what our country stands for. It’s also a terrific opportunity to make a good impression of the Macedonian Community. Our UMD crew visited several offices and met even more people from both sides of the aisle. My hope is that in two years we will have a large crowd attend this special event because it truly is a wonderful experience.
Whether it’s on a day like January 3rd, or a meeting at the home office, meeting with these public pfficials and their staff is important because they need to hear from us and put a face with a name of the Macedonian Community. It really does make a difference.
Many people believe there is not much that can be done from here in the U.S. If you think that the battleground of the cultural war for Macedonia’s Sovereignty, Self Determination and Security is fought only in Macedonia you are wrong. It’s fought here in the United States of America in more ways than one. I have a perfect example of an event that happened on the day I was on Capitol Hill, which proves this point. While we were getting in the elevator in one of the buildings which houses the offices of members of Congress, a large group of “lobbyists” from a neighboring country of Macedonia were in the hallway. They were there for the same reasons we were, but their interests are not supportive of the Macedonian people.
This is exactly why advocating on behalf of Macedonians is critical.
The United Macedonian Diaspora’s Headquarters may be in Washington D.C, but I like to think they have satellite offices in every home of every Macedonian in the United States.
Let’s make 2019 the year for the Macedonian voice to be heard loud and clear in our homes, in our hearts, and in the ears of our elected public officials.
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The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Macedonian Diaspora and Generation M.
Reader, if you’ve been kind enough to click on this post I can only suppose you know a little about the United Macedonian Diaspora.
I didn’t when I first clicked onto this site.
This might surprise you by way of confession for its new Communications Director, but there’s your logic for why it matters right there.
You see, three years ago I couldn’t point to Macedonia on a map. I have a degree in International Relations, and yet when my now fiancée told me she was from there I had to pause for a moment.
As I’ve discovered, there’s an uncanny parallel between my native Scotland and the country I now consider a second home. It’s almost offensive to call them ‘my in-laws’, it’s such a stoic term that lacks any of the experience that goes with it, for they took me under my wing and educated me about who, and what, Macedonia is.
My Macedonian family told me about their culture, their history and what the Germans call a ‘Weltanschauung’ – their way of thinking. I am eternally grateful for the enthusiasm and love my Macedonian side have extended to me – language was never even much of a barrier, but the sheer exhaustion that my better half endured as her conversationalist of a grandfather and I met to discuss *everything*, well, I’ll let her tell you that story.
Macedonia and Scotland are united in maths. Small countries of a few million have, over the centuries, somehow managed to form a global diaspora double the size of their homelands. An affinity for the home country and a love for where these disparate diasporas have made their new home is not an oxymoron. To be ‘Macedonian’ and to be ‘Scottish’ are two self-descriptions which are far wider and deeper than mere geographic boundaries.
There is, however, one big difference. As Macedonia’s very right to self-determination is rooted in an absurd name debate, its diaspora seems dwarfed. There is a horrible predisposition to cite ‘the Balkans’ as a staple of nationalism and a hotbed of hate. It’s an unfortunately enduring cliche, and one that must, and should, be challenged at every turn.
So that’s where the UMD come in. From the first time I clicked on to the site and right through working with the organisation it has become, remains, and will continue to be the defining light for Macedonian interests. Its work is ambitious, but it’s rooted in the simple belief that Macedonian culture is global, transcendental and should be unified to showcase the best and serve its people spread out across the world.
It also happens to adopt those who cherish the opportunity to support it and learn more about it.
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Photo: Gevgelija, Macedonia / Credit: Alastair Stewart
The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Macedonian Diaspora and Generation M.
The term “genocide” was first coined by Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin in 1944, and has since been defined in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as:
‘… with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such:
Killing members of the group;
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
Yet, we often overlook and don’t talk enough about the genocide of culture, identity, language and tradition. Indeed, Lemkin himself initially referred to the annihilation of groups, including the destruction of culture, identity and language along with national feelings, personal security, liberty and dignity. Although not being explicitly referred to in the official UN definition of the term, these elements are nonetheless present within The Convention itself.
As a student of International Relations and Human Rights, this has often led me to think about the effects of genocides on later generations, effects as such that could arguably be referred to as a ‘modern day genocide’ regarding issues such as the continual denial of a nations right of self-determination, its citizens and those within the diaspora’s right to self-identify, the refusal of property rights, denying language schools and so on and so forth. Furthermore, during the course of my degree at Monash University, I have read theories and indeed noticed that in academic circles there is often a hierarchy of what counts as legitimate ontology and epistemology, or rather, what is legitimate knowledge and how we know that to be. In this regard, there is a hierarchy of what counts as a legitimate culture and/or identity. In this sense the concept of ‘othering,’ also arises, where one’s own sense of identity is framed in response to some ‘other,’ which tends to be singled out, repressed, appropriated or excluded. It is with these concepts in mind where personal experiences have highlighted those effects regarding the continuation, as well as, the effects of past genocides in the modern day and age. My argument here is that past genocide not only affects those that lived throughout that trauma, but it also affects their kin, as well as those that identify with that specific, and targeted, national, ethnic, racial or religious group.
Now, what do I mean by this in the context of Macedonia? Well first and foremost I identify as a Macedonian born in Australia, but as someone who is also the granddaughter of one of the Decata Begalci (“the Refugee Children”), who were forcibly displaced from Aegean Macedonia (what is today in Greece). So, you can see how the current events concerning Macedonia’s name change and the deal with Greece for accession to the European Union is an international relations and human rights issue that strikes protest within me.
I do not want to attempt to go into debates about whether Macedonia should or shouldn’t become the Republic of North Macedonia, and whether this as a means of European integration will bring “zivot vo Makedonija” (“life to Macedonia”) … although some of you can probably guess my stance on this, the point I am trying to highlight is that past events, in conjunction with political tensions, have a significant influence and effect in prolonging present-day injustices. In this regard, families and to some degree national groups affected by genocides arguably cannot in whole remove themselves from the past.
For example, my grandma’s experiences during the Greek Civil War impacted how she was treated by Greek border officials 30 years later, and even today when striking a conversation with a stranger at the local Deli and being told “Macedonian? But aren’t you Greek, you Greek!” highlights the continual aspects of discrimination at a local level, which in effect relates to and is a consequence of those past and present political issues at a national and international level, such as Macedonia’s name change.
You might now ask, but how have I directly experienced this? A 21-year-old in her final semester of her Bachelor’s Degree, who in assumption should be surrounded by professional academics, whose motto is ‘question everything,’ and who encourage one to think critically about international relations and theory. And the answer is yes, I have definitely experienced this and rather by those academics themselves. Although they may be ill-informed or see the issues concerning Macedonia differently to me, this does not hide the fact that I have indeed been condescendingly told ‘we will not refer to it (Macedonia) as Macedonia, we will refer to it as FYROM because that’s its official name’… despite the fact that its official constitutional name is The Republic of Macedonia, which has also been internationally recognised by some 140 countries including Russia and the U.S.
Furthermore, in the height of the Prespa agreement (which moreover violates the constitution of Macedonia) signed by Zoran Zaev and Alexis Tsipras, close friends of mine travelling around Europe at the time had been satirically laughed at. Laughed at the fact that they called themselves Macedonian, considering that ironically, ‘Macedonia never was and never will be Macedonian.’ And although we in the diaspora, are continually being told that we do not have a say because we are not living under Macedonia’s current poor standards, in my view, do have a say. For what decisions are made at a national and domestic level by Macedonia, has a direct effect on how we will be identified as within the diaspora, not to mention those of us who possess documents stamped with ‘The Republic of Macedonia,’ which over time will have to be changed.
A country should not be forced to change who and what it is, or for that matter be forced by others to change its name under any condition at all, including whether that be for European integration. The effects of this concerning current political tensions which Macedonia is battling with, emphasises the influences which past events in correlation with political tensions have on contemporary issues and prejudices, and more importantly on prolonging them, rather than coming to an equitable solution.
So then, if Macedonia does indeed change its name and constitution under such external and indeed internal pressures, this will not only affect the identity politics of Macedonian people currently living there but will also affect how those are identified within the diaspora. This is not just about improving Macedonia’s standards, but it’s about the continual oppression and manipulation of one specific ethnic group and nation, and a failure in recognising and giving justice to those genocide survivors and their families from 72 years ago. And in the context of needing to break barriers, despite being continually disregarded and silenced, the infamous quote of “nevertheless she persisted” elucidates to the reality that, so too, will majka Makedonija (mother Macedonia).
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The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Macedonian Diaspora and Generation M.
