Tag: Prespa Agreement

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Minority Rights and Treatment of the Macedonians in Greece in the 20th and 21st Century

Think of any European Union member state; wouldn’t you envision it holding up core European Union values? Well, unfortunately, for the ethnic Macedonian minority population in Greece, it has seen its birthright to basic human rights encroached upon by the government, population, and church of Greece from the early 1900s to this day. This is important because every minority should have their rights respected, and for a European Union member, this should be a non-issue. Self-determination is a right that should be afforded to all peoples and defined as; their right to freely determine their political status, economic, social, and cultural development (UNPO: Self-Determination). Greece denies the Macedonians their basic and fundamental right to self-determination with their oppressive actions and policy of; forced assimilation and discrimination. To understand why the Macedonians in Greece should be given their basic fundamental rights as a minority we will take a look at the denial of the Macedonian identity, discrimination of the Macedonian minority, and the Greek obligations to international laws.

Denial of the Macedonian identity

The official Greek position is that Greece is ethnically homogenous with only a Muslim minority in western Thrace under the 1923 treaty of Lausanne (Whitman). The Greek assertion is to deny the ethnic Macedonian minority’s human rights and continue along their homogenous path; by implementing a strategy of forced assimilation called Hellenization. In other words, the official Greek policy is to claim that those living in the Macedonia region are simply recognized by geography as Macedonian, which does not include a different ethnic and linguistic background.

Hellenizing of the Macedonians in Greece has been detrimental to a unified Macedonian consensus and has destroyed the existence of Macedonian literacy through force and fear. Hellenization started in the late 1800s but began on a more massive scale in 1913 after the first Balkan war and the partition of Macedonia under the treaty of Bucharest. This process of denial of a different ethnicity began with the physical changing of the names of Macedonians and their graves/churches/cities/towns/villages (Ślupkov). Also included as a part of Hellenization was a series of population exchanges with Turkey and Bulgaria in the 1920s that destabilized the ethnic Macedonian majority in their home area and turned it into a minority, while stimulating the Greek national identity in an area that at one time had a limited reach.

With the Metaxas 4th of August fascist regime of 1936-1941, the Macedonian language was banned, and Hellenization only intensified; repression of expression in the Macedonian language was a major focus. Fines, beatings, and imprisonment occurred to anyone who expressed a Macedonian identity or spoke their mother tongue (Ślupkov). Without question, the Greek civil war from 1943-1949 was tragic, as Macedonian families encountered killings, persecution, imprisonment, and exile at the hands of the Greek government army (Greece’s Invisible Minority, BBC).

The Greek civil war was a war fought between the Greek government army and the communist party of Greece (KKE); the Macedonian minority largely fought with and was favorable towards the KKE because the KKE supported the ethnic Macedonian minority as well as their national identity, although some Macedonians found themselves conscripted and/or to protect their families ended up serving in the Greek army. With the Macedonian minority supporting the KKE the repercussions they endured were enormous; torture, beheadings, hangings, villages burned, imprisonment to prisoner of war camps, and thousands of children and fighters exiled, most of whom would end up never seeing their homes and family again (Macedonia, Virtual 1). The island of Makronisos was the main prisoner of war camp; it was run by Greek priests and the Greek government army. In Makronisos prisoners were beaten daily many of whom were arrested and sent to these islands for doing nothing more than being Macedonian (Makronisos Isle of Shame).

The Greek military junta, led by George Papadopoulos, along with fellow middle-ranking Army officers, from 1967-1974 saw many more Macedonian’s imprisoned. In 1982, with Greece’s socialist government, hostilities lowering as they allowed civil war refugees in exile to return, but only those declaring Greek ethnicity (Greece’s Invisible Minority, BBC). In later years, it was the Macedonians themselves–expatriates and ones still living in Greece, who were afraid to express their national identity and speak their mother tongue due to the fear Hellenization instilled and passed down through generations. These actions led to further oppression of the Macedonian identity, still by forced assimilation. This inhuman policy did not allow the Macedonian minority the right to self-determination by any stretch of the imagination; there was no right of the Macedonians to freely determine their political status, go to their own churches, have their own schools. Instead, they were forcibly Hellenised by the Greek state in their pursuit of homogeneity.

Discrimination of the Macedonian minority

Discrimination against the Macedonians in Greece is still happening; their language and culture are still vehemently denied by the Greek government today. The far-right Neo-Nazi fascist party, Golden Dawn, and police forces continue to intimidate locals and will not allow for the freedom of expression and freedom of association. In 2009 American linguist Victor Friedman, while promoting a Greek to Macedonian dictionary (Balkan Insight), was attacked in Athens by Golden Dawn thugs. With the Macedonian language banned, attempts to open up Macedonian language and cultural centres to preserve the language and culture were all but shut down due to being prohibited by law (Ślupkov). The Macedonian political party, Rainbow, which works for the promotion of Macedonian rights in Greece, has had their party headquarters burned, ransacked and their members persecuted (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices For 1995). Macedonian employees have seen discrimination in the private sector and widespread discrimination in the public sector. Macedonians from Greece who have emigrated for a better life have found discrimination at Greek borders trying to return to their ancestral homes, often denied or given hard times because the place of birth on their passport says the Macedonian name of their village, not the new Greek imposed name (Strezovski). Greek priests refuse to baptise Macedonian children if the parents give a Macedonian name for baptism, and the priest will instead give the child an imposed Greek name as the conditions for the baptism (Loring). Macedonian cultural dances and traditional songs are still frowned upon, as police usually come and harass the villagers until they shut it down.

Macedonian Orthodox Churches in Greece have been left in a state of ruin under direction from the Greek Orthodox Church. The Greek Orthodox Church claims legitimacy over the Macedonian Orthodox Church, which is a violation of the Sevres Treaty signed in 1920 by Greece allowing for all Christians in Greece the right to establish their own autonomous church (Macedonia, Virtual 1). Freedom of the press for Macedonians in Greece has also been limited as the government’s official statement is not to allow “propaganda” to spread against Greece. With the repeated discrimination against the Macedonian minority, we can see the stigma it has generated as well as the implications that have arisen over the years. This discrimination has not allowed the Macedonian minority the right to self-determination; there is no right to the Macedonian’s to freely pursue economic, social, and cultural development.

Greek obligations to international laws

With all that the Macedonian minority of Greece has endured, it is alarming to realize this has happened under the watch and by the hands of a European Union member and signatory of the CSCE Helsinki accords, despite specific articles on national minorities in 1990 and 1991. Despite having joined the European Union in 1981, Greece still doesn’t respect the EU’s fundamental values of respect for human dignity, rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law. Moreover, Greece’s actions are also in direct opposition to the treaty of Lisbon signed in 2009, which gives universal rights to citizens, such as political, economic, and social rights. Now since the Macedonian minority are Greek citizens, they are afforded rights and privileges of the European Union and therefore should be respected by the Greek government. However, despite all of this, it hasn’t changed anything for the Macedonians, who still are denied their right to self-determination, identity and are instead left with daily discrimination.

It is now abundantly clear how far Greece has gone to try and achieve ethnic homogeneity, and over a century of forced Hellenization shows that they will keep going without waver. As 21st-century citizens, we all ought to recognize how morally wrong the Greek state has been in its position to not allow the Macedonians their fundamental right to self-determination. The forced assimilation and discrimination have led to death, persecution, and a shame that will forever stain the country of Greece for their treatment of the Macedonians.

References

Feature Photo: The State Archives of the Republic of Macedonia (DARM), https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Deca_begalci_1.jpg

Whitman, Lois. Denying Ethnic Identity. Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 11.

UNPO: Self-Determination. Unpo.Org, 2017, https://unpo.org/article/4957.

Ślupkov, Ireneusz Adam. The Macedonian National Question In Greece In The Documents Of The Communist Party Of Greece 1918-1940. LULU COM, 2018.

1.Macedonia, Virtual. “Ethnic Macedonians In Greece A Human Tragedy Within The Boundaries Of The European Union”. Virtual Macedonia, 2020, https://vmacedonia.com/history/macedonians-in-greece/ethnic-macedonians-in-greece-a-human-tragedy-within-the-boundaries-of-the-european-union.html.

“Greece’s Invisible Minority”. BBC News, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-47258809.

“Chapter I”. Un.Org, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html.

2.Macedonia, Virtual. “Denial Of Human Rights For Macedonians In Greece | Virtual Macedonia”. Virtual Macedonia, 2020, https://vmacedonia.com/history/macedonians-in-greece/denial-of-human-rights-for-macedonians-in-greece.html.

MAKRONISOS ISLE OF SHAME”. Greektravel.Com, 2020, https://www.greektravel.com/greekislands/makronisos/.

Country Reports On Human Rights Practices For 1995. U.S. G.P.O., 1996, p. 878.

“Group Storms Greek-Macedonian Dictionary Promotion”. Balkan Insight, 2020, https://balkaninsight.com/2009/06/03/group-storms-greek-macedonian-dictionary-promotion/.

Strezovski, Atanas. “My First Visit To My Birthplace, The Village Neret Near Lerin In Aegean Macedonia”. Pollitecon.Com, 2004, http://www.pollitecon.com/html/life/My_First_Visit_To_My_Birthplace.htm.

Danforth, Loring M. The Macedonian Conflict. Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 120,121.

Any opinions or views expressed in articles or other pieces appearing in UMD Voice are those of the author alone and are not necessarily those of the United Macedonian Diaspora and its young leaders’ program Generation M; the appearance of any such opinions or views in UMD Voice is not and should not be considered to be an endorsement by or approval of the same by UMD and Generation M.

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Macedonia and the EU – Assessing Bulgaria’s Language Demands

On March 25, 2020, the Council of the European Union issued a written procedure providing updates regarding the enlargement process and potential inclusion of Macedonia and Albania within the EU.  In this brief four-page procedure, Bulgaria details several conditions required to be met before approving Macedonia’s future negotiating framework for EU accession. Among these conditions, the most notable is a peculiar implementation of the “language clause” previously utilized in both the Macedonia – Bulgaria Joint Declaration of 1999 and 2017 Friendship Treaty. More specifically, Bulgaria requested the following:

“Implementation of the “language clause” agreed between Sofia and Skopje in the agreements of the Republic of North Macedonia with the EU, including in the future Negotiating Framework. Thus, the linguistic norm spoken by the population of the Republic of North Macedonia should only be referred to as “the official language of the Republic of North Macedonia” in EU documents/positions/statements, including the future Negotiating Framework. No document/position/statement by the EU and its institutions can be interpreted as recognition of the existence of a separate so-called “Macedonian language”.[1]

In simpler terms, Bulgaria is declaring that the language clause utilized in previous agreements permits an omission of the Macedonian language from future EU correspondence and records. However, this assertion does not seem well-grounded. Even when considering Macedonia’s controversial name change, the language clause itself does not imply that the country’s official language must be called “The official language of the Republic of North Macedonia” instead of the “Macedonian language”. For clarity, the language clauses from both the 1999 Joint Declaration and 2017 Friendship Treaty have been provided below:

Joint Declaration of 1999

“Done at Sofia on 22 February 1999 in two original copies, each one in the official language of both countries, the Bulgarian language, in accordance with the constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Macedonian language, in accordance with the constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, each text being equally authentic.”[2]

Friendship Treaty of 2017

“Signed in two original copies, each in the official languages ​​of the Contracting Parties – Macedonian language, in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia and Bulgarian language, in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, with both texts equally important.”[3]

As shown by the above language clauses from 1999 and 2017, the wording states that documents will be printed in the official language of each party in accordance with its constitution – and in both cases the Macedonian and Bulgarian languages are listed. Thus, there is misapplication of the language clause on the part of Bulgaria. Many may wonder why this issue has come up, and the reality is that historical disagreements and political maneuvering have played a factor. Bulgaria has not officially recognized the Macedonian language and continues to deny basic rights to ethnic Macedonians in Bulgaria, often rejecting their existence. For example, a 2019 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report on Bulgaria noted the following: “Authorities continued to deny registration of the Macedonian activist group OMO Ilinden, despite a January judgment and 10 prior decisions of the European Court of Human Rights that the denials violated the group’s freedom of association.”[4]

Stepping back to the language issue, even after contentious passage of the Prespa Name Change Agreement between Macedonia and Greece, it did not cause Macedonia to alter its official language.  Thus, Bulgaria has little substance to support an exclusion of the Macedonian language from being mentioned in EU documents. Claiming that “No document/position/statement by the EU and its institutions can be interpreted as recognition of the existence of a separate so-called “Macedonian language” is a significant provocation and goes against the concept of “good neighborly relations” often championed by the Bulgarian government. One fundamental reason the Bulgarian argument lacks merit is because the Macedonian language has been widely recognized for several decades. Additionally, a denial of the Macedonian language by one country should not diminish Macedonia’s presence within the EU. Trying to impose such censorship of the Macedonian language across the EU not only shows poor form but further strains an already delicate relationship between the two countries. Macedonia and Bulgaria have previously addressed their disagreements through the integration of the language clause within the 1999 and 2017 agreements mentioned earlier. With this clause, Bulgaria has been able to bypass official recognition of the Macedonian language, and Macedonia has been able to maintain relative stability with an important strategic partner – even if the actual agreements have been unjust in some respects (e.g. no protected minority status for ethnic Macedonians in Bulgaria who do not have Macedonian citizenship). 

To presume that the language clause now changes focus to include only the new (and many would argue illegitimate) name, “The official language of the Republic of North Macedonia”, but not the language recognized by the UN and Prespa Agreement is counterintuitive. Perhaps more curious is the fact that an additional condition set forth by Bulgaria is the “Full implementation of treaties between the Republic of North Macedonia and EU Member States”. This would imply that the Prespa Agreement between Macedonia and Greece (an EU member state) must be fully implemented. If so, then the following clause within Article 1(3)(c) of the Prespa Agreement cannot be disregarded:

Article 1(3)(c)

“The official language of the Second Party shall be the “Macedonian language”, as recognised by the Third UN Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names, held in Athens in 1977, and described in Article 7(3) and (4) of this Agreement.”[5]

As shown within Article 1(3)(c), the Prespa Agreement recognizes the Macedonian language, as previously established by the UN in 1977. This further accentuates Bulgaria’s misstep – it cannot simultaneously require implementation of the Prespa Agreement while also lobbying against the Macedonian language, a key feature within the Prespa Agreement. 

There is a clear contradiction between the Prespa Agreement and recent demands made in the EU written procedures from March 25, 2020. This situation displays the vast challenges for a smaller country like Macedonia who is simply vying to become more stable and economically secure. Macedonia has been forced to sacrifice vital national interests to unlock the doors to NATO and the EU, yet still finds itself being taken advantage of by neighboring countries. This situation poses important questions regarding what obstacles lie ahead for Macedonia and whether EU membership is ultimately worth the tradeoff. As has often been the case, the principles of self-determination and mutual respect from neighboring countries seem to be overlooked in the case of Macedonia, and this can only contribute to increased tension and instability in the Balkans.

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Any opinions or views expressed in articles or other pieces appearing in UMD Voice are those of the author alone and are not necessarily those of the United Macedonian Diaspora and its young leaders’ program Generation M; the appearance of any such opinions or views in UMD Voice is not and should not be considered to be an endorsement by or approval of the same by UMD and Generation M.

[1] “Council of the European Union Written Procedure”. Council conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process the Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Albania. March 25, 2020. https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/EU/XXVII/EU/01/66/EU_16606/imfname_10969905.pdf

[2] “Review and Implementation of The Concluding Document of The Twelfth Special Session of The General Assembly Strengthening of Security And Cooperation In The Mediterranean Region Sustainable Development And International Economic Cooperation.” United Nations General Assembly 53rd Session. March 1999. https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/A/53/855

[3] “The Text of the Agreement on Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Bulgaria”. July 2017. 

Текстот на Договорот за пријателство, добрососедство и соработка меѓу Република Македонија и Република Бугарија

[4] “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bulgaria”. U.S. Department of State. 2019. https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bulgaria/

[5] “The Prespa Agreement” Full text of the Final Agreement on Resolving the Macedonian-Greek Name Dispute and Strategic Partnership. 2018.  https://vlada.mk/node/17422

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The Prespa Agreement Unwrapped

It is a new day in the Balkans, as many have applauded the “historic” Prespa Agreement reached between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece to officially change the name from Macedonia to “North Macedonia”. To many in the United States and other western countries, this agreement has been applauded for being a great example of how bilateral disputes can be overcome. However, before drawing such a conclusion, we should consider the whole picture of what happened, how it happened, and what it truly means for the Macedonian people. Let’s start by looking back at how the Prespa Agreement was approved.

On Friday, October 19, 2018 two‐thirds of the members of Parliament in Macedonia voted in favor of constitutional changes as required by the Prespa Agreement with Greece, which effectively led to changing the name of Macedonia to “North Macedonia” for domestic, bilateral and international use (or “Erga Omnes”). Given that the turnout of the Macedonian referendum failed to reach the required 50% threshold, one would presume that the country’s democratic allies might be puzzled that two‐thirds of parliamentary members took matters into their own hands as opposed to respecting the majority of voters who elected not to participate in the referendum.

In the Macedonian name referendum on September 30, 2018, there were approximately 1,800,000 eligible votes and just over 666,000 people went to the polls, garnering a turnout of just below 37%. Even with this being a consultative (i.e. non‐binding) referendum, there was little excitement from the people for this deal – as shown by the small turnout. These figures present the reality that most citizens (over 60%) had reservations about the Prespa Agreement and did not believe it was in the country’s best interest.

A supporter of the boycott movement celebrates the low turnout of the referendum – Skopje, Macedonia, US News.

Ultimately, lawmakers in any democracy must recognize when the citizens are sending a message. Even with months of intense lobbying and campaigning by foreign officials such as Federica Mogherini and Johannes Hahn of the EU, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, United States Secretary of Defense James Mattis and several others, the referendum failed. It is also important to mention that all these visitors to Macedonia made a point to say, “There is no alternative, you cannot enter EU or NATO without the Prespa Agreement”. This is not what modern‐day democratic principles should entail. Attempting to influence a referendum outcome by intimidating the people with an ultimatum is the exact opposite of what “European Values” mean. Not only this, but even after the referendum results did not land in the favor of the governing majority and foreign officials, they continued to push for constitutional changes as if the referendum was a success. From a neutral perspective, this is the most difficult aspect to grasp – does this not cross the line of infringement upon a nation’s sovereignty and the will of its people?

Stepping away from the questionable events at the time of this referendum, let’s revert to Friday, October 19th, 2018, when the vote on constitution changes took place. In the week leading up to this vote, there was little belief that the ruling coalition had enough votes, as the SDSM‐led governing majority possessed only 72 votes and required an additional 8 votes from the opposition party, VMRO‐DPMNE, in order to reach the two‐thirds majority required to approve changing the constitution. Then came Friday, when the parliamentary session and vote was slated to take place around 3PM but had been delayed 6 hours until approximately 9PM. Seemingly out of nowhere, the government coalition got exactly 8 more votes to reach the amount needed to approve constitutional revision. There have been suspicions that several of the MP’s were bribed or blackmailed to flip their vote in favor of constitutional changes. A few of these parliamentary members had even been incarcerated for events related to violence in the Parliament the previous year on April 27, 2017, when Talat Xhaferi (Former KLA/NLA commander) was controversially elected as Speaker of the Assembly. More specifically, 3 members of VMRO‐DPMNE, Krsto Mukoski, Ljuben Arnaudov, and Saso Vasilevski who had been charged for their role in events taking place on April 27, 2017, were all released from house arrest just days before this vote. Interestingly, all 3 of them voted in favor of constitutional changes, which their party did not support. All these happenings seem too coordinated to be taken as pure coincidences. It is evident that both externally and internal there was immense pressure to approve the constitutional changes. Even the Defense Minister of Greece, Panos Kammenos, believed this to be the case, having claimed that politicians in Skopje were bribed to push the vote through.

With such important questions asked of the citizens and no mandate provided, it is irresponsible for lawmakers to move forward with changes to the country’s constitution.

Now that we have touched on the controversies surrounding this vote, let’s examine the thoughts and minds of the actual citizens who did vote in favor of the agreement, as they still make up a significant chunk (609,000+) of the nation’s voters and should not be overlooked. For a Macedonian citizen (of any ethnic background), being put to the test of voting to change the constitutional name of the country in exchange for potential EU and NATO membership is not an easy decision. Though most would not accept an Erga Omnes (i.e. for all purposes) solution to the problem that Greece has with Macedonia’s name, there were still a fair number of citizens were willing to make that sacrifice in the referendum. In their position, it is difficult to live in Macedonia under the current conditions; citizens are desperate and trying to find any way to gain economic prosperity – including leaving the country. In other words, some citizens view acceptance of the Prespa Agreement as a ticket out of the country. Given that multiple countries within the EU today experience problems with stagnant population growth and negative migration (i.e. Bulgaria, Romania), this is not a farfetched theory. The true question here is whether Macedonia would fare any better than nearby countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, who are larger economies with bigger populations.

Below are the Total Populations, Net Migration, and Population Growth Rates for the three countries mentioned above. A positive net migration indicates there are more people entering than leaving a country, while a negative net migration shows that more people are leaving a country than coming in within the year. The population growth rate is annual population growth shown as a percentage (regardless of legal status or citizenship).

2017 estimates, derived from The World Bank.

As displayed in the table above, two countries situated near Macedonia who are also EU and NATO members continue to struggle with negative net migration and shrinking populations.  In fact, when considering the figures above, Bulgaria and Romania appear to be in slightly worse condition than Macedonia when it comes to these two statistics.  Net Migration and Population Growth Rates tell only part of the story, but certainly offer a benchmark to compare the overall population stability of these three nations. When considering population totals, Romania (nearly 10x larger) and Bulgaria (approximately 3.5x larger) both have greater bandwidth to tolerate negative net migration and a diminishing population than does Macedonia. Moreover, this evidence does not suggest that entrance into the EU and NATO will keep people in Macedonia, and neither do the motives of Macedonian citizens who supported the Prespa Agreement, as a number of them are trying to escape the stagnant economic conditions at any cost. Now, there are potential benefits to joining the EU and NATO, such as better prospective long-term stability and potential for greater trade and investment opportunities, but it should not come at the cost of Macedonian national interests – especially when citizens did not provide a mandate through the referendum.

So, many of you are probably wondering what is in the “Prespa Agreement”. Thus, we should take a moment to analyze its most critical contents, which have been highlighted below (*Please note that the “First Party” in the agreement is Greece and “Second Party“ is Macedonia).

Within Article 1, Section 11 the agreement states the following:

As one can see, this section states “…ratification of this agreement by its Parliament or following a referendum, if the Second Party (Macedonia) decides to hold one.” Because Macedonia decided to hold a referendum, the results undoubtedly hold merit – but this was ignored by members of the Macedonian Parliament and other global actors. 

The clause shown above, within Article 1(3)(b), notes that the nationality of the citizens for all travel documents will read “Macedonian/Citizen of the Republic of Northern Macedonia”. If the identity of Macedonians was protected, as many defenders of the agreement have claimed, then why must there be the addition of “/Citizen of the Republic of Northern Macedonia”? This is a clear case of Greece seeking to minimize Macedonian self‐identification. When denoting nationality in a travel document, stating that a person is a “citizen of…….” does not make logical sense in this case. If the Macedonian identity were truly intact, the travel documents would continue stating “Macedonian”, as no other people in the globe call themselves Macedonian in an official manner, and there is no other state name that contains the word “Macedonia”.

Greeks from the northern portion of Greece (also known as Aegean Macedonia) are no exception – their passports state “Greek/Hellenic” under nationality, not “Macedonian” or “South Macedonian”. Because of this fact, there is little confusion nor is there an actual need for additional verbiage after “Macedonian”. This is one of many reasons why the Prespa Agreement does not solidify the Macedonian identity, but fragments it.

Article 1(3)(e) above is a technical clause that is simply designed not to provoke Greeks when Macedonian vehicles enter Greece. If the country code remains MK or MKD, what is the purpose of the name change in the first place? This section suggests that the country is to be informally called “Makedonija” or “Macedonia”. It appears to be somewhat open-ended and could lead to future disputes due to name use at sporting events like the Olympics, World Cup Qualification, or Handball Championships. Greeks could very well cite provocation by Macedonia for using banners, signs, or apparel that says “Makedonija” or “Macedonia”. Overall, it seems unlikely that the Prespa Agreement has fully solved this aspect of the issue.

The above paragraph, within Article 4(3), may seem like basic rhetoric, but is quite crippling to those of Macedonian descent in Northern Greece. With this paragraph, Greece has effectively erased the connection between Macedonians in the Republic of Macedonia and in Northern Greece. This is important because of the ethnic suppression that took place against Macedonians in Northern Greece since the Balkan wars concluded in the early 20thcentury. To put it into perspective, most of these folks were either forcibly assimilated (i.e. names changed, forced to speak Greek instead of Macedonian), tortured or killed. Keep in mind that this was all before Macedonia had a country of its own, and thus, citizens of its own. This clause provides Greece with a clever way of evading the reality that there is a Macedonian minority in Greece, because it eliminates the Republic of Macedonia’s right to fight for protection against discrimination of the Macedonian minority in Greece. Keep in mind that vast majority of ethnic Macedonians in Northern Greece are not Macedonian citizens, therefore cannot be protected as a minority within Greece because of this portion of the agreement.

The above clauses within Article 7 dangerously attempt to make historical assertions in a political agreement – assertions that are not well‐grounded. Macedonia is far from being “One and Greek” – just ask Greek parliamentary representative Nikos Filis, who explicitly said this when addressing the Greek assembly on January 22, 2019, stating: “When it is heard that Macedonia is one and is Greek, it is perceived as irresponsible. Maybe it does not sound good but it is a reality. And to be more specific, Macedonia became Greek because Macedonian population up to 1912‐22 that came to refugees had a majority Greek only in some zones in the South”. Ultimately, this clause in the agreement displays a negligent attempt by the Greeks to monopolize ancient Macedonian history.

Article 8, parts 1, 2 and 3 shown above are some of the most inflammatory portions of the agreement, whereby the old Macedonian national flag symbol (the 16‐ray sun) which has been a historic symbol of Macedonia for centuries, cannot be used in any public space. Further, the agreement makes note that “Archaeological artifacts do not fall within the scope of this provision”. In other words, though there may be historical artifacts, symbols, findings and other indications that this symbol is connected to the very land it sits on – the 16‐ray sun cannot be shown in public. If readers want to truly get to the crux of the name issue, Macedonian identity, and bilateral dispute with Greece, this is where it lies. At no juncture has the Republic of Macedonia claimed exclusive rights to ancient Macedonia, its symbols, or its history. The stance of the Republic of Macedonia has always been that the country is one part of that rich history, and therefore has a right to celebrate it.

Let us use an example. There is a Macedonian man named Marko. He was born in Bitola, just a few miles from the ancient Macedonian city of Heraclea. He is proud of this fact and feels he has a connection to ancient Macedonia. The real question is: Does Marko, or any other Macedonian citizen who feels a connection to ancient Macedonia, have the right to proudly express these symbols and lineage? Any scholar, lawyer, judge or even the writers of the Prespa Agreement would say “Yes”.

If this is the case, then why does the country where many people like Marko live not have ITS right to be proud of that history?

This is the heart of the problem. While Greece seeks to control Macedonian history from antiquity to present, it is destroying its neighboring country’s future. Many Macedonians understand that they have a significant Slavic element in their culture and are mixed between Slavic cultural heritage and that of the ancient Macedonians in some way. It is through no fault of their own that the Ancient Macedonian language was not fully written and standardized.  It is through no fault of their own that they have been ruled over by Turks, Bulgarians, Serbians and others, undoubtedly undergoing assimilation just like many other ethnic groups throughout the Balkans. It is through no fault of their own that Macedonians in Greece had their names forcibly changed and were tortured or killed. No, none of this is the fault of the Macedonian people. Even with all these challenges, it is impossible to negate one thing – that Macedonians exist. No one can take away the fact that Marko and his family live on the very soil where Filip II of Macedonia (Alexander the Great’s father) ruled and where his statue lies.

Article 8(5) shown above is yet another provocation within the agreement. This clause is a prime example of Greece exerting pressure to extract additional concessions. The Prespa Agreement IS about identity, no matter how much Nikola Dimitrov, Zoran Zaev, Radmila Sekerinska or anyone else denies it. If all of this is simply about renaming the country and accepting that Macedonians are allowed to self‐determine, then why are all these additional stipulations included from a historical, education, and symbolic standpoint? Teaching children an altered past of their own country and changing the materials they learn from sets a dangerous precedent. It will be interesting to see if there will be any alterations to Greek textbooks, though that seems quite unlikely…

Article 19(2) – Greece’s trump card. The true meaning behind this paragraph is to say, “If they don’t hide the old flag, change schoolbooks, change all official documents and government buildings to state “North Macedonia”, then the deal is off and the doors to EU and NATO are closed.”

There are several troublesome sections within the Prespa Agreement, and it seems to raise more questions than it answers. It is about much more than switching the name from “Macedonia” to “North Macedonia”. If that were the case, the document would have been a single page in length. To an average person trying to make sense of this issue, please remember the international rights of self‐determination and the right to name one’s own state. How would you feel if a foreign nation was taking a vote to verify the name of your own country? Most would feel embarrassed, as many Macedonians currently do. 

Nonetheless, the final step towards ratification of the Prespa Agreement took place when Greece’s Parliament narrowly approved of the agreement with 153 members voting in favor out of the 300‐seat assembly. This changed Macedonia’s official name to “North Macedonia”.

Though this agreement has passed and it may take decades to reverse it, we must all be aware of the conditions under which it was approved, its inflammatory contents, and most of all, understand that this was not what the majority of Macedonians both in Macedonia and around the globe wanted. It is imperative that all political and social actors respect the will of the Macedonian people and continue referring to the country as “Macedonia” – the name which has been recognized by nearly 70% of U.N. states.

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Any opinions or views expressed in articles or other pieces appearing in UMD Voice are those of the author or interviewees alone and are not necessarily those of the United Macedonian Diaspora and its young leaders’ program Generation M; the appearance of any such opinions or views in UMD Voice is not and should not be considered to be an endorsement by or approval of the same by UMD and Generation M.

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The Prespa Agreement is a Mess — Here’s What We Do Next.

The Prespa Agreement is a monstrosity. It’s moral and political spew on every ground. Every one of its pages imbues the Orwellian warning, “The most effective way to destroy people is to deny and obliterate their own understanding of their history”. Not only does it suffocate the cries of ethnic cleansing from the not-so-distant past, but it also attempts to draw a moral equivalence between the parties as being co-equal aggressors and transgressors in this dispute.

Effectively, Macedonia will become the first politically correct state in Europe. Pride in one’s people, culture, and heritage, nowadays seen as embarrassing and vestigial relics of a bygone era, will be steamrolled by an unstoppable train of progress and social engineering. These new “Macedonians/Citizens of the Republic of North Macedonia” (Somehow, I don’t think that will translate well into our folk songs) will wake up to a Macedonian state in name only. Macedonia will no longer be seen as the nation-state of the Macedonian people and a home for all of its minorities. It will be a modern, censored political construct—wholly disconnected from its roots and past for the sake of a rootless transnational agenda agreed upon in the upper echelons of power in Brussels.

That being said, this is not the worst we have been dealt. The Serbian authorities under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia attempted to erase Macedonia from the map, and relentlessly uproot all remnants of its non-Serbian past. Bulgarian fascist terror in World War II made even the German Nazis fare better in the eyes of Macedonians by comparison. And lest we forget the terror of the Metaxas regime in Greece, where speaking Macedonian or even mentioning Macedonia could result in physical torture, if not outright death. 

The Prespa Agreement is nowhere near the level of brutality we have seen in the past. However, it can be—if we let it. If we sit back, continue complaining vocally but doing nothing, and thus allowing our children, grandchildren, and posterity to be eradicated. This won’t happen overnight; it’s an ever-so-slow drip of complacency and indifference that accumulates over time to a nightmarish reality. 

However, according to recent reports, 68% of Greece is against the agreement. To us, this may seem odd. Why would hyper-nationalistic and paranoid Greece be so opposed to an agreement that secures their claims to the legacy of ancient Macedonia, as well as control over our use of symbols and history textbooks? Well, despite all the footnotes in the Prespa Agreement about our language,  and the convoluted formulaic ways of expressing our nationality, Greece still technically loses out. Outside the narrow bubble of international law—NO ONE, and I repeat NO ONE— will mentally disassociate our people, who speak the Macedonian language and are called Macedonians, from the past heritage of Macedonia. Think about it. Do you think the average Western traveler when hearing that the Macedonians live in “North Macedonia”, will think to immediately refer to Article 8 of the Prespa Agreement to see that the terms “Macedonian” in this context refer to a different people, history and culture, than those of the ancient period? Of course not, but this won’t dishearten Greek Twitter from trying.

By agreeing even to a quasi-recognition (notice, I don’t mean a full recognition) of a Macedonian language and nationality, Greece has opened its appropriately-named Pandora’s box. Despite all the attempts over the years by Greek keyboard warriors to correct BBC or CNN headlines with “FYROM” instead of Macedonia, Greece had already lost the battle to remove Macedonia from outside usage in the late 90s. Now it will take on the Herculean task of explaining how their recognition of a Macedonian language and nationality does not amount to a recognition of an ethnic Macedonian people. Not to mention it will also have to explain how some of the people in their own borders who speak that same Macedonian language they recognized are not in fact of the same stock of people as their neighbors to the north. In a word, it can’t. As stated in a Greek article, “However, these distinctions do not change the fact that, no matter what the Greek government is saying, people with the Macedonian nationality, who speak the Macedonian language, will automatically be considered ethnic Macedonians.” 

This is where the diaspora, the church, family and community have to truly show their worth. None of the intended and malicious outcomes of the agreement can come true if we do not let them. 

Our history books will eventually be revised and mandated to call all place-names in Aegean Macedonia by their Greek names. Kukush (the birthplace of Goce Delcev) will thus become Kilkis to our students. However, even after the Greeks physically razed it to the ground and renamed it Kilkis, it never slipped away from the collective memory of the Macedonian people–our greatest junak was born there. Why should it now?

The state will be forbidden from using the 16-rayed Macedonian sun in a public capacity. Even when our flag was forcibly changed, the Macedonian people have not given up using this rightful ethnic symbol. Not one iota. In fact, it has fantastically increased in its usage, and I encourage ever-more use. 

And most importantly, no faceless bureaucrat in Brussels  can ever compel anyone to call themselves anything but Macedonians. No one can forbid us from privately teaching our children our true history: the glorious conquests of Alexander; the holy work of St. Cyril and Methodius; the terror of the partition of our lands. 

As in Ottoman times, in the face of adversity, we have to return to our roots. The church, not the state, has to become the glue to our community and culture. We have to strengthen our family units—invest heavily in ensuring our traditions, culture, language, and history are transmitted to future generations. Furthermore, diaspora groups must join forces to act as a vanguard for the interests of Macedonians. This means not allowing any utterance of “North Macedonians” or “Slav Macedonians” by uninformed commentators. This means aggressive and targeted marketing to sell the beauty of our land, culture and true history to everyone interested. Even when our government will ask us “in good will” to reconsider using the name “Macedonia” for our private businesses we, of course, have to act and politely show them the door. In a word, we have to be subversive in the name of injustice. 

Is the Prespa Agreement a garbage fire of an agreement? Yes. Will it solve any of our problems? Probably not. Can the agreement do anything to curtail a united and subversive Macedonian people? Well, you tell me. Are you ready to move away from patriotic Facebook posts and put your money where your mouth is? Preserving our identity for our posterity, especially in the diaspora,  will not be an easy task. Subverting the intended goals of the Prespa Agreement will be even harder. But out of this chaos, we have secured an infinitely strategic starting point–a Macedonian language, nationality, and state recognized by Greece. No matter the legalistic jargon about the actual scope of the Greek recognition, this trifecta offers the opportunity for us to control the optics and narrative surrounding our identity. Only an apathetic and disunited people can let mere words on a paper trample on them and extinguish all hope.

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The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Macedonian Diaspora and Generation M.

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“I am Macedonian”: Why the ongoing inter-generational theft of the Macedonian identity must be acknowledged

The term “genocide” was first coined by Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin in 1944, and has since been defined in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as:

 

‘… with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such:

  1. Killing members of the group;
  2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
  3. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
  4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group

 

Yet, we often overlook and don’t talk enough about the genocide of culture, identity, language and tradition. Indeed, Lemkin himself initially referred to the annihilation of groups, including the destruction of culture, identity and language along with national feelings, personal security, liberty and dignity. Although not being explicitly referred to in the official UN definition of the term, these elements are nonetheless present within The Convention itself.

 

As a student of International Relations and Human Rights, this has often led me to think about the effects of genocides on later generations, effects as such that could arguably be referred to as a ‘modern day genocide’ regarding issues such as the continual denial of a nations right of self-determination, its citizens and those within the diaspora’s right to self-identify, the refusal of property rights, denying language schools and so on and so forth. Furthermore, during the course of my degree at Monash University, I have read theories and indeed noticed that in academic circles there is often a hierarchy of what counts as legitimate ontology and epistemology, or rather, what is legitimate knowledge and how we know that to be. In this regard, there is a hierarchy of what counts as a legitimate culture and/or identity. In this sense the concept of ‘othering,’ also arises, where one’s own sense of identity is framed in response to some ‘other,’ which tends to be singled out, repressed, appropriated or excluded. It is with these concepts in mind where personal experiences have highlighted those effects regarding the continuation, as well as, the effects of past genocides in the modern day and age. My argument here is that past genocide not only affects those that lived throughout that trauma, but it also affects their kin, as well as those that identify with that specific, and targeted, national, ethnic, racial or religious group.

 

Now, what do I mean by this in the context of Macedonia? Well first and foremost I identify as a Macedonian born in Australia, but as someone who is also the granddaughter of one of the Decata Begalci (“the Refugee Children”), who were forcibly displaced from Aegean Macedonia (what is today in Greece). So, you can see how the current events concerning Macedonia’s name change and the deal with Greece for accession to the European Union is an international relations and human rights issue that strikes protest within me.

 

I do not want to attempt to go into debates about whether Macedonia should or shouldn’t become the Republic of North Macedonia, and whether this as a means of European integration will bring “zivot vo Makedonija” (“life to Macedonia”) … although some of you can probably guess my stance on this, the point I am trying to highlight is that past events, in conjunction with political tensions, have a significant influence and effect in prolonging present-day injustices. In this regard, families and to some degree national groups affected by genocides arguably cannot in whole remove themselves from the past.

 

For example, my grandma’s experiences during the Greek Civil War impacted how she was treated by Greek border officials 30 years later, and even today when striking a conversation with a stranger at the local Deli and being told “Macedonian? But aren’t you Greek, you Greek!” highlights the continual aspects of discrimination at a local level, which in effect relates to and is a consequence of those past and present political issues at a national and international level, such as Macedonia’s name change.

 

You might now ask, but how have I directly experienced this? A 21-year-old in her final semester of her Bachelor’s Degree, who in assumption should be surrounded by professional academics, whose motto is ‘question everything,’ and who encourage one to think critically about international relations and theory. And the answer is yes, I have definitely experienced this and rather by those academics themselves. Although they may be ill-informed or see the issues concerning Macedonia differently to me, this does not hide the fact that I have indeed been condescendingly told ‘we will not refer to it (Macedonia) as Macedonia, we will refer to it as FYROM because that’s its official name’… despite the fact that its official constitutional name is The Republic of Macedonia, which has also been internationally recognised by some 140 countries including Russia and the U.S.

 

Furthermore, in the height of the Prespa agreement (which moreover violates the constitution of Macedonia) signed by Zoran Zaev and Alexis Tsipras, close friends of mine travelling around Europe at the time had been satirically laughed at. Laughed at the fact that they called themselves Macedonian, considering that ironically, ‘Macedonia never was and never will be Macedonian.’ And although we in the diaspora, are continually being told that we do not have a say because we are not living under Macedonia’s current poor standards, in my view, do have a say. For what decisions are made at a national and domestic level by Macedonia, has a direct effect on how we will be identified as within the diaspora, not to mention those of us who possess documents stamped with ‘The Republic of Macedonia,’ which over time will have to be changed.

 

A country should not be forced to change who and what it is, or for that matter be forced by others to change its name under any condition at all, including whether that be for European integration. The effects of this concerning current political tensions which Macedonia is battling with, emphasises the influences which past events in correlation with political tensions have on contemporary issues and prejudices, and more importantly on prolonging them, rather than coming to an equitable solution.

 

So then, if Macedonia does indeed change its name and constitution under such external and indeed internal pressures, this will not only affect the identity politics of Macedonian people currently living there but will also affect how those are identified within the diaspora. This is not just about improving Macedonia’s standards, but it’s about the continual oppression and manipulation of one specific ethnic group and nation, and a failure in recognising and giving justice to those genocide survivors and their families from 72 years ago. And in the context of needing to break barriers, despite being continually disregarded and silenced, the infamous quote of “nevertheless she persisted” elucidates to the reality that, so too, will majka Makedonija (mother Macedonia).

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The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Macedonian Diaspora and Generation M.