Macedonia has a history spanning over 4,000 years, and the region has changed hands between many powers since time immemorial and has been a bone of contention between the Great Powers and Balkan states since the turn of the 20th century. For the sake of convenience and political relevance today, this summary will focus on the past 120 years, and mostly on relations with Greece.
At the turn of the 20th century, Macedonia
was still directly controlled by a rapidly declining Ottoman Empire. Greece,
Bulgaria, and Serbia had just gained independence and were still finding their
feet as independent regional powers. As each of these newly emergent states
were vying for more territory, they all had their sights set on gaining
Macedonia for themselves. Macedonians were the targets of large propaganda campaigns,
mostly coming from the churches in the region. Each of these states sought to
win over the hearts and minds of Macedonia’s people using a variety of methods
and varying degrees of persuasion and force.
To represent Macedonia before independence, a revolutionary organization was created by the name of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and was responsible for creating the resistance movement against the Ottomans. The IMRO led the Ilinden Uprising of 1903 and created the very first, but short-lived Krusevo Republic, which is considered the first independent Macedonian State. The republic was overrun and crushed by the Ottomans ten days after the republic was established, and it is still an extremely symbolic event in Macedonia’s history.
Several territories, including Macedonia, temporarily formed an alliance to drive the Ottomans from the Balkans once and for all in what would be known as the First Balkan War. At the end of the war, the Great Powers the territory of Macedonia was divided. The region known as Vardar Macedonia which is today’s Republic of Macedonia was given to Serbia. Aegean Macedonia was given to Greece, and Bulgaria took the smallest portion of Pirin Macedonia. Bulgaria was not content with the arrangement and instigated the Second Balkan War to take back the whole of Macedonia, but was defeated. The Treaty of Bucharest ended the Second Balkan War.
During each states’ tenure of holding their respective
portions of Macedonia, the people of Macedonia had their ethnic identities
extremely repressed. In Greece, Macedonians underwent a process of forced
Hellenization, or assimilation, and were not allowed to speak their own
language. All Macedonian cultural activities and organizations were suppressed
by the Greek state. Many villages and towns, as well as Macedonian families
also had their names forcibly changed from Macedonian to Greek names. In Vardar
Macedonia, Macedonians suffered a similar fate at the hands of the Serbian
government, and even the name Macedonia itself was banned. The Serbian and
later Yugoslav government resorted to referring to the region as the Vardar
Banovina.
Following WWI, the Macedonians were forced to accept their fate as being citizens of the respective states they were living in, and during WWII, they were split between joining resistance movements to the Nazis in Greece and Yugoslavia, and collaborating with them in Bulgaria. A large portion of the Greek Resistance Movement was comprised of roughly 12,000 Macedonians, who later became a large contributor to the KKE’s manpower in the Greek Civil War just after WWII. After WWII, Vardar Macedonia was given the status of a constituent republic of Yugoslavia under Josip Broz Tito, and eventually became today’s Republic of Macedonia. In Aegean Macedonia, people were not so lucky. The Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia found themselves brutally oppressed during the years prior to and during WWII by dictator Ioannis Metaxas, and thousands of Macedonians were forced into prison camps on Aegean Islands. Many people were brutally beaten, tortured, and forced to drink castor oil simply for identifying as Macedonian or speaking the Macedonian Language.
During the Greek Civil War, the Macedonians sided with the KKE after being promised that they would be united with Vardar Macedonia and allowed a fully united, and independent state of all ethnicities within Macedonia. Unfortunately for the Macedonians, the KKE lost the war, and Aegean Macedonia remained in the hands of Greece. Following the war, over a hundred thousand Macedonians were forced out of Aegean Macedonia and are still no longer allowed to return by order of the Greek government. Minority status still has not been given to Macedonians, and they still are not allowed to conduct business in their own language. Assertion of Macedonian identity is still cause for extreme harassment in Greece, and human rights are still violated in Aegean Macedonia to this day.
Following the independence of the Republic of Macedonia in 1991, Greece placed an economic embargo on the country over the name of the country, as well as the use of Macedonian cultural symbols in their flag. Due to Greece’s continual veto of Macedonian accession to NATO and the European Union over the use of its name, the Macedonian government filed a lawsuit against its neighbor. Both states testified in the Hague in 2011, and fifteen of sixteen judges ruled that Greece had violated international law, as it had earlier agreed to allow Macedonia to join the European Union.
Though Macedonia and Greece have had tension between state leaders and politicians in the past, most Macedonians and Greeks wish to be reconciled and cooperate with each other in peace. The global Macedonian community has been extremely disappointed by the lack of accountability for Greece’s actions in the past, and continued discrimination imposed upon Macedonians today. The Macedonian Community humbly asks that the Macedonian minority of Greece gets the recognition it has long been denied and that those who were exiled be granted permission by the Greek government to return to their homes.
Source of feature photo: Painting of the Macedonian Struggle found in The Museum of the Macedonian Struggle in Skopje, Macedonia
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Any opinions or views expressed in articles or other pieces appearing in UMD Voice are those of the author alone and are not necessarily those of the United Macedonian Diaspora and its young leaders’ program Generation M; the appearance of any such opinions or views in UMD Voice is not and should not be considered to be an endorsement by or approval of the same by UMD and Generation M.
In the 24 years since Macedonia and the United States established full diplomatic ties, Macedonia-U.S. commercial relations are growing on a slow, but steady pace. Last year, bilateral trade in goods hit $394.8 million, which indicates a slow rise since diplomatic relations were forged. In comparison, Greece managed to secure economic trade of $2.65 billion with the United States in the same period. Even though economic trade is a single indicator, it is a strong reflection of the slow integration of Macedonia’s economy in the world economy.
As Macedonia’s path to NATO is inevitable, we can utilize the stability to explore options that will bring a greater amount of U.S. business to Macedonia and vice versa. A comprehensive free trade agreement between the two countries secures the progression of business endeavors that will yield economic results and progress.
Macedonia has a great deal to offer to the U.S.: low taxes of 10% on personal and corporate income, competitive wages, stable currency pegged to the euro, open economy that welcomes foreign direct investment and trade, EU and NATO candidate country, low inflation, and a young workforce fluent in English.
As a result of the transition period of the 1990s, countless large factories and facilities were abandoned, providing opportunities for the construction and building materials sector. Some of these abandoned factories can be reorganized and rebuilt to use robotics, which would lead to well-paid jobs for a number of highly educated people. Cooperation in the agricultural sector with American companies and the introduction of advanced agricultural techniques will help to convert raw materials into finished products in order to obtain higher market prices. The textile industry can be used to create clothing for many well-known American brands. Call centers and freelancers are among the main working roles that can be used to intensify Macedonian-American commercial interests. As the economy moves towards digitization, creating opportunities that will adapt to these factors will further develop relationships.
The goal of Macedonia in terms of trade relations with the United States should be deep and broad cooperation that will transform it into a country with a modern and prosperous economy. Approaching individual companies and municipalities in the United States must be a priority to convey know-how and diverse opportunities for the country. In addition, undertaking further activities for engaging communities where Macedonians are present will lead to new partnerships and commercial opportunities.
Engaging with energy entrepreneurs like Elon Musk and his company Tesla to turn Macedonia into a 100% energy independent country (through the same concept as Hawaii), would position Macedonia in a marketing sense, opening new opportunities in an underdeveloped sector. Having a single call center that would work for US technology giants such as Amazon and eBay will create a stable income for many families working in the technology and communication sectors.
The vision of a modern, prosperous and stable Macedonia may seem overly optimistic in the short term as there are several setbacks that must be addressed including: rule of law and corruption, slow judicial processes, complex bureaucracy, lack of infrastructure, political interference, contradicting legislation and regulation. These setbacks require immediate action by both the legislative and judicial branches.
Overall, the benefits of the above proposed cooperation between the two countries can be observed in the next decade, with potential bilateral trade and investments that would reach up to $2 billion, as Macedonian-American cooperation has wide and still unexplored perspectives.
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Any opinions or views expressed in articles or other pieces appearing in UMD Voice are those of the author or interviewees alone and are not necessarily those of the United Macedonian Diaspora and its young leaders’ program Generation M; the appearance of any such opinions or views in UMD Voice is not and should not be considered to be an endorsement by or approval of the same by UMD and Generation M.
It is a new day in the Balkans, as many have applauded the “historic” Prespa Agreement reached between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece to officially change the name from Macedonia to “North Macedonia”. To many in the United States and other western countries, this agreement has been applauded for being a great example of how bilateral disputes can be overcome. However, before drawing such a conclusion, we should consider the whole picture of what happened, how it happened, and what it truly means for the Macedonian people. Let’s start by looking back at how the Prespa Agreement was approved.
On Friday, October 19, 2018 two‐thirds of the members of Parliament in Macedonia voted in favor of constitutional changes as required by the Prespa Agreement with Greece, which effectively led to changing the name of Macedonia to “North Macedonia” for domestic, bilateral and international use (or “Erga Omnes”). Given that the turnout of the Macedonian referendum failed to reach the required 50% threshold, one would presume that the country’s democratic allies might be puzzled that two‐thirds of parliamentary members took matters into their own hands as opposed to respecting the majority of voters who elected not to participate in the referendum.
In the Macedonian name referendum on September 30, 2018, there were approximately 1,800,000 eligible votes and just over 666,000 people went to the polls, garnering a turnout of just below 37%. Even with this being a consultative (i.e. non‐binding) referendum, there was little excitement from the people for this deal – as shown by the small turnout. These figures present the reality that most citizens (over 60%) had reservations about the Prespa Agreement and did not believe it was in the country’s best interest.
A supporter of the boycott movement celebrates the low turnout of the referendum – Skopje, Macedonia, US News.
Ultimately, lawmakers in any democracy must recognize when the citizens are sending a message. Even with months of intense lobbying and campaigning by foreign officials such as Federica Mogherini and Johannes Hahn of the EU, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, United States Secretary of Defense James Mattis and several others, the referendum failed. It is also important to mention that all these visitors to Macedonia made a point to say, “There is no alternative, you cannot enter EU or NATO without the Prespa Agreement”. This is not what modern‐day democratic principles should entail. Attempting to influence a referendum outcome by intimidating the people with an ultimatum is the exact opposite of what “European Values” mean. Not only this, but even after the referendum results did not land in the favor of the governing majority and foreign officials, they continued to push for constitutional changes as if the referendum was a success. From a neutral perspective, this is the most difficult aspect to grasp – does this not cross the line of infringement upon a nation’s sovereignty and the will of its people?
Stepping away from the questionable events at the time of this referendum, let’s revert to Friday, October 19th, 2018, when the vote on constitution changes took place. In the week leading up to this vote, there was little belief that the ruling coalition had enough votes, as the SDSM‐led governing majority possessed only 72 votes and required an additional 8 votes from the opposition party, VMRO‐DPMNE, in order to reach the two‐thirds majority required to approve changing the constitution. Then came Friday, when the parliamentary session and vote was slated to take place around 3PM but had been delayed 6 hours until approximately 9PM. Seemingly out of nowhere, the government coalition got exactly 8 more votes to reach the amount needed to approve constitutional revision. There have been suspicions that several of the MP’s were bribed or blackmailed to flip their vote in favor of constitutional changes. A few of these parliamentary members had even been incarcerated for events related to violence in the Parliament the previous year on April 27, 2017, when Talat Xhaferi (Former KLA/NLA commander) was controversially elected as Speaker of the Assembly. More specifically, 3 members of VMRO‐DPMNE, Krsto Mukoski, Ljuben Arnaudov, and Saso Vasilevski who had been charged for their role in events taking place on April 27, 2017, were all released from house arrest just days before this vote. Interestingly, all 3 of them voted in favor of constitutional changes, which their party did not support. All these happenings seem too coordinated to be taken as pure coincidences. It is evident that both externally and internal there was immense pressure to approve the constitutional changes. Even the Defense Minister of Greece, Panos Kammenos, believed this to be the case, having claimed that politicians in Skopje were bribed to push the vote through.
With such important questions asked of the citizens and no mandate provided, it is irresponsible for lawmakers to move forward with changes to the country’s constitution.
Now that we have touched on the controversies surrounding this vote, let’s examine the thoughts and minds of the actual citizens who did vote in favor of the agreement, as they still make up a significant chunk (609,000+) of the nation’s voters and should not be overlooked. For a Macedonian citizen (of any ethnic background), being put to the test of voting to change the constitutional name of the country in exchange for potential EU and NATO membership is not an easy decision. Though most would not accept an Erga Omnes (i.e. for all purposes) solution to the problem that Greece has with Macedonia’s name, there were still a fair number of citizens were willing to make that sacrifice in the referendum. In their position, it is difficult to live in Macedonia under the current conditions; citizens are desperate and trying to find any way to gain economic prosperity – including leaving the country. In other words, some citizens view acceptance of the Prespa Agreement as a ticket out of the country. Given that multiple countries within the EU today experience problems with stagnant population growth and negative migration (i.e. Bulgaria, Romania), this is not a farfetched theory. The true question here is whether Macedonia would fare any better than nearby countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, who are larger economies with bigger populations.
Below are the Total Populations, Net Migration, and Population Growth Rates for the three countries mentioned above. A positive net migration indicates there are more people entering than leaving a country, while a negative net migration shows that more people are leaving a country than coming in within the year. The population growth rate is annual population growth shown as a percentage (regardless of legal status or citizenship).
As displayed in the table above, two countries situated near Macedonia who are also EU and NATO members continue to struggle with negative net migration and shrinking populations. In fact, when considering the figures above, Bulgaria and Romania appear to be in slightly worse condition than Macedonia when it comes to these two statistics. Net Migration and Population Growth Rates tell only part of the story, but certainly offer a benchmark to compare the overall population stability of these three nations. When considering population totals, Romania (nearly 10x larger) and Bulgaria (approximately 3.5x larger) both have greater bandwidth to tolerate negative net migration and a diminishing population than does Macedonia. Moreover, this evidence does not suggest that entrance into the EU and NATO will keep people in Macedonia, and neither do the motives of Macedonian citizens who supported the Prespa Agreement, as a number of them are trying to escape the stagnant economic conditions at any cost. Now, there are potential benefits to joining the EU and NATO, such as better prospective long-term stability and potential for greater trade and investment opportunities, but it should not come at the cost of Macedonian national interests – especially when citizens did not provide a mandate through the referendum.
So, many of you are probably wondering what is in the “Prespa Agreement”. Thus, we should take a moment to analyze its most critical contents, which have been highlighted below (*Please note that the “First Party” in the agreement is Greece and “Second Party“ is Macedonia).
Within Article 1, Section 11 the agreement states the following:
As one can see, this section states “…ratification of this agreement by its Parliament or following a referendum, if the Second Party (Macedonia) decides to hold one.” Because Macedonia decided to hold a referendum, the results undoubtedly hold merit – but this was ignored by members of the Macedonian Parliament and other global actors.
The clause shown above, within Article 1(3)(b), notes that the nationality of the citizens for all travel documents will read “Macedonian/Citizen of the Republic of Northern Macedonia”. If the identity of Macedonians was protected, as many defenders of the agreement have claimed, then why must there be the addition of “/Citizen of the Republic of Northern Macedonia”? This is a clear case of Greece seeking to minimize Macedonian self‐identification. When denoting nationality in a travel document, stating that a person is a “citizen of…….” does not make logical sense in this case. If the Macedonian identity were truly intact, the travel documents would continue stating “Macedonian”, as no other people in the globe call themselves Macedonian in an official manner, and there is no other state name that contains the word “Macedonia”.
Greeks from the northern portion of Greece (also known as Aegean Macedonia) are no exception – their passports state “Greek/Hellenic” under nationality, not “Macedonian” or “South Macedonian”. Because of this fact, there is little confusion nor is there an actual need for additional verbiage after “Macedonian”. This is one of many reasons why the Prespa Agreement does not solidify the Macedonian identity, but fragments it.
Article 1(3)(e) above is a technical clause that is simply designed not to provoke Greeks when Macedonian vehicles enter Greece. If the country code remains MK or MKD, what is the purpose of the name change in the first place? This section suggests that the country is to be informally called “Makedonija” or “Macedonia”. It appears to be somewhat open-ended and could lead to future disputes due to name use at sporting events like the Olympics, World Cup Qualification, or Handball Championships. Greeks could very well cite provocation by Macedonia for using banners, signs, or apparel that says “Makedonija” or “Macedonia”. Overall, it seems unlikely that the Prespa Agreement has fully solved this aspect of the issue.
The above paragraph, within Article 4(3), may seem like basic rhetoric, but is quite crippling to those of Macedonian descent in Northern Greece. With this paragraph, Greece has effectively erased the connection between Macedonians in the Republic of Macedonia and in Northern Greece. This is important because of the ethnic suppression that took place against Macedonians in Northern Greece since the Balkan wars concluded in the early 20thcentury. To put it into perspective, most of these folks were either forcibly assimilated (i.e. names changed, forced to speak Greek instead of Macedonian), tortured or killed. Keep in mind that this was all before Macedonia had a country of its own, and thus, citizens of its own. This clause provides Greece with a clever way of evading the reality that there is a Macedonian minority in Greece, because it eliminates the Republic of Macedonia’s right to fight for protection against discrimination of the Macedonian minority in Greece. Keep in mind that vast majority of ethnic Macedonians in Northern Greece are not Macedonian citizens, therefore cannot be protected as a minority within Greece because of this portion of the agreement.
The above clauses within Article 7 dangerously attempt to make historical assertions in a political agreement – assertions that are not well‐grounded. Macedonia is far from being “One and Greek” – just ask Greek parliamentary representative Nikos Filis, who explicitly said this when addressing the Greek assembly on January 22, 2019, stating: “When it is heard that Macedonia is one and is Greek, it is perceived as irresponsible. Maybe it does not sound good but it is a reality. And to be more specific, Macedonia became Greek because Macedonian population up to 1912‐22 that came to refugees had a majority Greek only in some zones in the South”. Ultimately, this clause in the agreement displays a negligent attempt by the Greeks to monopolize ancient Macedonian history.
Article 8, parts 1, 2 and 3 shown above are some of the most inflammatory portions of the agreement, whereby the old Macedonian national flag symbol (the 16‐ray sun) which has been a historic symbol of Macedonia for centuries, cannot be used in any public space. Further, the agreement makes note that “Archaeological artifacts do not fall within the scope of this provision”. In other words, though there may be historical artifacts, symbols, findings and other indications that this symbol is connected to the very land it sits on – the 16‐ray sun cannot be shown in public. If readers want to truly get to the crux of the name issue, Macedonian identity, and bilateral dispute with Greece, this is where it lies. At no juncture has the Republic of Macedonia claimed exclusive rights to ancient Macedonia, its symbols, or its history. The stance of the Republic of Macedonia has always been that the country is one part of that rich history, and therefore has a right to celebrate it.
Let us use an example. There is a Macedonian man named Marko. He was born in Bitola, just a few miles from the ancient Macedonian city of Heraclea. He is proud of this fact and feels he has a connection to ancient Macedonia. The real question is: Does Marko, or any other Macedonian citizen who feels a connection to ancient Macedonia, have the right to proudly express these symbols and lineage? Any scholar, lawyer, judge or even the writers of the Prespa Agreement would say “Yes”.
If this is the case, then why does the country where many people like Marko live not have ITS right to be proud of that history?
This is the heart of the problem. While Greece seeks to control Macedonian history from antiquity to present, it is destroying its neighboring country’s future. Many Macedonians understand that they have a significant Slavic element in their culture and are mixed between Slavic cultural heritage and that of the ancient Macedonians in some way. It is through no fault of their own that the Ancient Macedonian language was not fully written and standardized. It is through no fault of their own that they have been ruled over by Turks, Bulgarians, Serbians and others, undoubtedly undergoing assimilation just like many other ethnic groups throughout the Balkans. It is through no fault of their own that Macedonians in Greece had their names forcibly changed and were tortured or killed. No, none of this is the fault of the Macedonian people. Even with all these challenges, it is impossible to negate one thing – that Macedonians exist. No one can take away the fact that Marko and his family live on the very soil where Filip II of Macedonia (Alexander the Great’s father) ruled and where his statue lies.
Article 8(5) shown above is yet another provocation within the agreement. This clause is a prime example of Greece exerting pressure to extract additional concessions. The Prespa Agreement IS about identity, no matter how much Nikola Dimitrov, Zoran Zaev, Radmila Sekerinska or anyone else denies it. If all of this is simply about renaming the country and accepting that Macedonians are allowed to self‐determine, then why are all these additional stipulations included from a historical, education, and symbolic standpoint? Teaching children an altered past of their own country and changing the materials they learn from sets a dangerous precedent. It will be interesting to see if there will be any alterations to Greek textbooks, though that seems quite unlikely…
Article 19(2) – Greece’s trump card. The true meaning behind this paragraph is to say, “If they don’t hide the old flag, change schoolbooks, change all official documents and government buildings to state “North Macedonia”, then the deal is off and the doors to EU and NATO are closed.”
There are several troublesome sections within the Prespa Agreement, and it seems to raise more questions than it answers. It is about much more than switching the name from “Macedonia” to “North Macedonia”. If that were the case, the document would have been a single page in length. To an average person trying to make sense of this issue, please remember the international rights of self‐determination and the right to name one’s own state. How would you feel if a foreign nation was taking a vote to verify the name of your own country? Most would feel embarrassed, as many Macedonians currently do.
Nonetheless, the final step towards ratification of the Prespa Agreement took place when Greece’s Parliament narrowly approved of the agreement with 153 members voting in favor out of the 300‐seat assembly. This changed Macedonia’s official name to “North Macedonia”.
Though this agreement has passed and it may take decades to reverse it, we must all be aware of the conditions under which it was approved, its inflammatory contents, and most of all, understand that this was not what the majority of Macedonians both in Macedonia and around the globe wanted. It is imperative that all political and social actors respect the will of the Macedonian people and continue referring to the country as “Macedonia” – the name which has been recognized by nearly 70% of U.N. states.
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Any opinions or views expressed in articles or other pieces appearing in UMD Voice are those of the author or interviewees alone and are not necessarily those of the United Macedonian Diaspora and its young leaders’ program Generation M; the appearance of any such opinions or views in UMD Voice is not and should not be considered to be an endorsement by or approval of the same by UMD and Generation M.
The first round of the presidential elections in Macedonia was marked by voter apathy reflected in the low turnout. In a way, the April 19th vote was the second time Macedonians rejected the Prespa Agreement. Macedonians first rejected the Prespa Agreement in 2018, when the referendum for constitutional changes failed due to insufficient turnout – de facto invalidating its results. And secondly, SDSM candidate Pendarovski, who ardently supports the Prespa Agreement, lost almost 100,000 votes compared to SDSM’s convincing victory in the 2017 local elections. The first round was such a disappointment for the governing coalition that Prime Minister Zaev promised a large-scale governmental reshuffle briefly after the elections.
With the runoff quickly approaching, both VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM predict that their candidate will win, and most analysts agree that Sunday’s election will be a close one. Although the presidency is largely a ceremonial post, its outcome could have important bearings for Macedonian politics in the next five years and beyond.
There are three possible scenarios from Sunday’s election: victory by either Pendarovski or Siljanovska-Davkova, or alternatively, a failure to reach the 40% voter turnout threshold necessary to validate the results. We examine these three eventualities and predict what we might expect in each case.
Scenario 1: Pendarovski Wins
Pendarovski, a consensus candidate supported by both SDSM and DUI, is a well-known figure in Macedonian political circles. A political scientist by training, Pendarovski is a former national security advisor and ex-presidential candidate. The narrative surrounding his candidacy has emphasized Pendarovski’s independent standing and his apparent non-partisanship. His campaign promotes dialogue between the political parties, and Pendarovski himself pledged to work on creating compromises that transcend ideological lines. In reality, he is closely intertwined with the governing coalition, and his positions align perfectly to those of SDSM and DUI. What might his potential victory mean for Macedonian politics?
For starters, it is likely that Pendarovski will tow SDSM’s party line. After all, as former national security advisor and current national coordinator for NATO accession, Pendarovski was the obvious choice for the social democrats. If elected, Pendarovski will likely conform to the policies of the governing coalition, and transform the presidency from a current bastion of opposition under Ivanov into an extension of the prime minister’s office. His victory will reverse the current no-signing-of-laws policy practiced by Ivanov, who has refused to approve laws that contain the name North Macedonia.
Like SDSM and DUI, Pendarovski has been a vocal supporter of the Prespa agreement. He argued that its provisions achieved two goals: first, they protected the Macedonian language, culture and civilizational beliefs, and second, they build the basis for long-lasting cooperation with Greece. He pledged to support the agreement’s full implementation and to work on maintaining positive relationship with Macedonia’s neighbors, including Greece.
Furthermore, the consensus candidate status that SDSM and DUI bestowed upon Pendarovski necessitates that his policies appease the Albanian voting bloc. One way Pendarovski has sought to live up to this status is by promising a cabinet that entirely reflects the multiethnic character of the country. If elected, Pendarovski will likely be under pressure from the Albanian camp to enhance Albanian’s role in the presidential cabinet.
On foreign policy Pendarovski also will tow the party line. He is a staunch supporter of Macedonia’s EU and NATO integration, and he views the United States as a key strategic partner of the country. Lastly, on the question of diaspora relations Pendarovski prioritizes two goals: creating incentives for investment by Macedonians living abroad, and encouraging young students who completed their education abroad to return to the country.
Scenario 2: Siljanovska-Davkova Wins
Although Siljanovska-Davkova shares a right-leaning political outlook with the party that nominated her, VMRO-DPMNE, in many key respects she represents a departure from the traditional party line. She appears more pragmatic compared to Ivanov, and her potential victory is likely to have some transformative effects on Macedonian society.
For example, Siljanovska-Davkova is the first female presidential candidate to make it to the runoff vote. Experience from other countries suggests that electing a female candidate to the presidency can increase the robustness and quality of a country’s democracy. Studies show that electing a female head of state has positive spillover effects in democratic societies, such as electing higher number of female legislators down the road. Siljanovska-Davkova has been upfront about this potentiality: she has repeatedly stressed the need to increase women’s role in society, and pledged to include a number of qualified women in her cabinet. As commander of the armed forces, Siljanovska-Davkova promised to create a Center of Excellence for Women, Peace and Security which will aim toward expanding women’s contribution in the military. All in all, electing a woman president will likely have some transformative effects on perceptions about leadership roles for women in Macedonian society.
Siljanovska-Davkova has also been a staunch opponent of the Prespa Agreement. She holds that enacting the agreement violated national law and is disputable within international law framework. Not only has Siljanovska-Davkova refused to use the adjective North to refer to Macedonia’s name, but she also vowed to contest the agreement before the International Court of Justice. Although she promised not to cancel the accord, she considers the issue to be legally open.
When it comes to domestic politics, Siljanovska-Davkova has put significant emphasis on the rule of law. This is unsurprising considering her background in legal studies. Her campaign stresses the rule of law as the precursor to a functioning meritocracy. Siljanovska-Davkova believes that the current constitution is the Achilles heel of Macedonian democracy, and has inconsistencies and flaws linked to fundamental rights and constitutional protections. She pledged to form a team of constitutional experts tasked with finding flaws with the existing constitution and proposing new amendments.
On foreign policy, Siljanovska-Davkova is a proponent of westward integration and wants to see Macedonia closer to the EU and NATO. Finally, she has maintained positive relationship with the Macedonian diaspora, and she vowed to create a National Council for Cooperation with the Diaspora.
Scenario 3: Failure to reach 40% turnout
The third scenario following Sunday’s election is a failure to reach 40% turnout, the constitutional requirement for considering the outcome legally binding. In this eventuality, a new presidential election could be called, or the speaker of Parliament, Talat Xhaferi, could temporarily assume the presidency.
The latter of the two alternatives is by far the most spine-chilling outcome because of the miscreant behavior that characterizes Xhaferi’s political life. For one, Xhaferi was army deserter who joined the terrorist structure that fought in the ethnic conflict in 2001 under the name commander Forino. Following the Ohrid Framework Agreement Xhaferi received amnesty and was able once more to return to his political ambitions.
On top of this, Xhaferi has shown utter disregard for the rule of law by circumventing existing legal limitations on his powers as speaker of Parliament. His very election was marred with irregularities and disrespect for standard parliamentary procedures. If Xhaferi assumes the presidency, his activities could seriously jeopardize the already fragile state of the Macedonian democracy.
Conclusion
No matter the outcome of the election, Macedonia will continue its westward journey in the next five years. The domestic implications, however, are likely to be more substantial depending on who wins the public’s support on Sunday. Whereas Pendarovski’s election is likely to be a continuation of the status quo in Macedonian politics, Siljanovska-Davkova has a potential to bring significant societal transformation to the fore.
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The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Macedonian Diaspora and Generation M.
A recent article by the BBC titled ‘Greece’s Invisible Minority’ caused much uproar among Greeks. Most notably, the Greek ambassador to the United Kingdom, Mr. Dimitris Caramitsos-Tziras, wrote a letter to the BBC protesting the publication of the article. His response was of little surprise to anyone familiar with Greece’s perennial attempts to whitewash the history of its Macedonian minority. As the Greek backlash against BBC’s account continues, we take a moment to break down Mr. Caramitsos-Tziras’ letter and address the inaccuracies and purposeful omissions contained in it.
Mr. Caramitsos-Tziras starts his letter by proclaiming that “there is only one minority in Greece, as recognized by international treaties, namely the Muslim minority”. By means of Greece’s systematic exclusion of minorities this statement is true. However, the reality is that Greece is home to numerous minorities, including a sizeable Macedonian minority. The Greek denial of minority rights was raised as an issue by the United Nations a decade ago, following an observation mission conducted in Greece. The report comes to the following conclusion:
“The independent expert urges the Government of Greece to withdraw from the dispute over whether there is a Macedonian or a Turkish minority in Greece and focus on protecting the rights to self-identification, freedom of expression and freedom of association of those communities. Their rights to minority protections must be honoured in accordance with the Declaration on Minorities and the core international human rights treaties. Greece should comply fully with the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights, specifically those decisions that associations should be allowed to use the words “Macedonian” and “Turkish” in their names and to express their ethnic identities freely.”
Mr. Caramitsos-Tziras continues the letter by reminding the BBC that Greece does not recognize the existence of the Macedonian language. The Ambassador quotes the Prespa Agreement, which defines the Macedonian language “exclusively as the official language of North Macedonia”. Mr. Caramitsos-Tziras is in fact right to point out that the Prespa Agreement attempts to construct a new definition for an existing language that has been used by Macedonians throughout history. The language provision of the Prespa Agreement is only the latest manifestation of a century old effort by Greek authorities to wipe out Macedonian language.
The next two paragraph of Mr. Caramitsos-Tziras’ letter deal with the issue of implicit recognition of Macedonian ethnicity. The Ambassador claims that “Greece retains the right to refer to the citizens that comprise the ethnic majority in our neighboring country with the terms used to-date, whereas they retain the right to self-identification”. The Ambassador failed to note the rich history of Greek campaigns, both international and domestic, that sought to eradicate the existence of a Macedonian minority and prevent “Slavic speakers” from self-identifying as Macedonians. For example, in recent bilateral history Greece has used the derogatory term “Skopianos” to refer to Macedonians. Successive Greek governments have also embarked on diplomatic missions intended to rollback international recognition of Macedonia and Macedonians. Domestically, Greece has a long history of denying the existence of a Macedonian minority. Most noteworthy is Greek dictator Metaxas’ 1936 order of prohibition 122770, which made it illegal for Macedonians to speak Macedonian and forcibly changed Macedonian names into Greek ones.
Finally, Mr. Caramitsos-Tziras points out that the Prespa Agreement contains no reference to Macedonia retaining its right to support Macedonians in neighboring countries. This is one of the many reasons why the Prespa Agreement serves as yet another attempt by Greece to whitewash of its history. Refusal to acknowledge the existence of a Macedonian minority in Greece is central to the Greek effort to circumvent its past and present treatment of Macedonians.
In sum, Mr. Caramitsos-Tziras’ response to the BBC article is filled with inaccuracies and purposeful omissions. The Ambassador’s praise of specific Prespa Agreement provisions which nullify the right of Macedonians to repatriate their rights and losses is unbecoming for a member state of the European Union. We hope that future Greek efforts to distort history and disseminate lies about its treatment of Macedonians will be met with an appropriate international condemnation.
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The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Macedonian Diaspora and Generation M.
Generation M’s Global Co-Chair, Kristina Dimitrievski interviewed Erika Teneva, author of Moral Compass. Moral Compass is a collection of poems brought together to narrate dreams, depict family dynamics, and retell folklore. The mystical meets reality with the musings of psychological and philosophical renderings of political tension, personal struggle, modern day absurdities, and of course, love.
Erika, thank you for taking the time for this interview! Tell us a little bit about yourself.
I was born in Štip, Macedonia and I lived there until I was about 3. We moved to the U.S. in 2000, and eventually made our way to the Washington, D.C. area, which I love. In the meanwhile, I was spending my summers back home in Macedonia, making memories. These summers were when I was actively practicing (and basically relearning) my language and absorbing my heritage through first hand experiences. When the time came, I was looking at universities near by, so that I could return to the area that I grew to love so much and fortunately found American University Bulgaria (AUBG), from which I graduated last May. During my time there, Bulgaria became my third home and nestled its way into my heart as well. My undergrad was also when I rediscovered my love for stories, poems and telling stories through poetry!
Congratulations on your book, Moral Compass! Your family must be so proud of your accomplishments. Where is your family from in Macedonia?
Thank you! My mom’s side is from Delčevo/Selo Grad and my dad’s side is from Štip / Sokolarči.
What was the inspiration behind Moral Compass? How long was the entire process of creating this book?
My inspiration came from different elements of my life experiences, both in Macedonia and the U.S.. I already had some pieces of writing that I wanted to include in the book, but I started writing new poems, accumulating and editing them around February of 2018. I released the book the same year in December, so it was almost a full year of hard work.
What sparked your interest to begin writing poetry in general?
I’ve been writing since I was 12 years old. I remember the first poem I ever wrote was at the dining table with my mom, who is herself a writer. I asked her to write me one while I did the same for her, and her encouraging reaction to my poem was what made me believe I could write.
Is poetry your main outlet for your life experiences, or is there another medium you prefer?
I simply began with poetry. However, I am trying to branch out into other forms of writing! My plan is to delve into short stories and eventually work my way up to a novel.
What are your plans after Moral Compass? Any chances of writing another book?
Moral Compass was a test for myself and my abilities. It was a necessary first step toward the writing world, however I have a lot to learn. I am definitely thinking of another book, although it will be something other than poetry for now (I have to collect a few more pieces for another book). I constantly have ideas floating around in my head though, so I guess we’ll just have to see which ones manifest first.
What “modern day absurdities” do you like to write the most about, and do they affect your writing style?
The “modern day absurdities” that I write about in the book are mostly about love, mental health, and life’s philosophical reflections that I think everyone comes in contact with. When I was writing and compiling the pieces that fall under this category, I did notice that my tone tended to change to a more sarcastic and jaded one. This definitely was a darker twist in comparison to the rest of the book, which was written with a more whimsical and nostalgic feel.
What is some advice you would give to young aspiring or upcoming writers?
Don’t rush your writing; the words will come naturally
You will edit SO much, sometimes straying from the original, and that’s okay
ALWAYS write down any bursts of inspiration (whether it’s just a line, a word, or a whole theme). I can’t count how many times I didn’t write down beautiful lines, only to forget them later
You also do your own illustrations, can that be seen in your book as well?
I decided to do the cover and inside poem “dividers” myself digitally. It was difficult for me since I am more used to paper and a pencil, but again, it was a push towards understanding what I’m capable of.
What themes did you explore for your book? Are there some you will like to revisit or explore in more depth in your future endeavors?
Oh, for sure! I loved writing on the theme of tradition and folklore, and I definitely think this is something that will come up again and again in my future writing. Also, the theme of dreaming is one that has become my signature and I plan on growing this further for myself.
Does your poem East of the West sum up your experience living in the U.S.? If so, has your view changed at all since?
Absolutely. East of the West was meant to comment on the unfortunate downfalls of BOTH my Eastern and Western homes. My view hasn’t changed since, however, “my heart still beats and my soul still dances in a very hopeful middle” :-).
In your book, you delve into folklore. What was the process in writing and where did you draw your inspiration from?
Yes, this was the most fun part for me! I already knew some old folklore that was simply just passed down to me throughout the years by my mother, grandmother and even great-grandmother. I did, however, do some extra research and made sure to check with them about some of it. Traditional folklore has just always been totally riveting to me, and I truly enjoyed getting inspired by tales that have been passed down for generations. The Poem Rituals especially included some of my favorites that I’ve heard (and have tried!).
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Moral Compass can be purchased in both paperback and Kindle versions on Amazon, as well as Barnes & Noble and Apple Books.
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The views of the author may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Macedonian Diaspora and Generation M.
